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During February and March of the year 1766, a Dutch slaving vessel, the Meermin, 
was to be the site of an act of violent resistance, murder and an abortive bid for 
freedom. Approximately 140 Madagascan slaves revolted against the VOC crew 
manning the vessel and assume control of the ship; they were subsequently deceived 
by a Dutch crew desperate for their lives, transported to a region far from the island 
kingdoms that they regarded as home, and ultimately violently defeated on the coast 
of a foreign land, a land where many were to remain and die, recaptured by those over 
whom they had, for a brief moment, won such a devastating victory. Their grasp for 
liberty thwarted by an almost fantastic mixture of cunning, firepower and luck, they 
were ultimately to submit to the authority of the cause of their oppression, and to 
remain in the land from whiFh their attempts at flight had been directed. This land was 
\ 
the Cape Colony, under the hegemony of the VOC in the mid-18th Century; and on its 
coast, at the southernmost tip of the continent at Cape Agulhas, is the scene of this, 
one of the most violent, improbable and yet compulsive acts of resistance to occur in 
the early history of what is today modem South Africa. 
Acts of slave resistance have in many ways assumed a position of prominence in the 
popular consciousness. In films such as Amistad, we have portrayals, albeit in 
historically-distorted fashion, of slaves making desperate and idealistic bids for 
freedom and liberty; and, very often, such popular portrayals encapsulate the 
experience of slave resistance and rebellion within a broad language of freedom and 
self-determination that finds resonances with contemporary audiences. Such an event 















compulsive narrative, one that re-inscribes the themes that animate our popular 
conceptions of oppression and freedom. The actual historical reality of an event such 
as that of the Meermin may, however, do as much to undermine the standard 
narratives of slave resistances as to corroborate or substantiate them. The purpose of 
this essay is thus partly intended as a critique of what is so often taken for granted, of 
what is constituted of fantasy and passed as reality. Through a rigorous examination 
of historical sources that detail the events of a particular slave mutiny that occurred 
off Cape Agulhas in 1766, a narrative will be constructed that will be as faithful as 
possible to the actual events as they were recorded. From such a narrative, one will be 
able to examine aspects of slave resistance and mutiny that are illuminated in the light 
of this particular incident, an examination that may do something to debunk the myths 
that conceal and distance as much as they may inspire. 
What adds significance to this project is the current attempt to uncover the wreckage 
of the Meermin. Jaco Boshoff, a marine archaeologist, is currently engaged in a 
project to locate the site where the Meermin may be buried, and then, if successful, to 
excavate whatever remains of the vessel. The purpose of this paper is thus two-fold; 
while it is to be submitted for university assessment, it is also intended as a research 
project into the events of the uprising and wreck of the Meermin that will be used by 
those involved in the recovery scheme both as essential historical background, and as 
material from which various educational products relating to the event can be 
constructed. It is the hope of all concerned in the project that the recovery of the 
vessel will stimulate interest in both the specificities of this case, and in the broader 













The primary sources on which I have relied on order to reconstruct the events of the 
uprising fall into three categories. Dan Sleigh, who has written an unpublished 
account of the mutiny, has consulted the same sources as I have; however, for 
academic purposes this is the first time that they have been directly consulted with the 
intention of producing an official narrative While a few basic summarised versions of 
the story have been produced, they rely on the primary sources only in a marginal 
sense. Firstly, I have examined the court testimonies of officers and crew of the 
Meermin, compiled after the events had occurred and the slaves and crew had been 
transported back to Cape Town!. Two of the officers concerned, Gesaghebber Gerrit 
Christoffel Muller and Onderstuurman Daniel Carel Gulik were charged by the Court 
of Justice for negligence and for allowing conditions on board such that the 
murderous rebellion was made possible. In addition, two slaves, although not formally 
charged, were exiled to Robben Island in order to be observed by the Dutch who, 
even when the event was over, remained somewhat mystified by the way in which the 
slaves had so successfully mutinied against the European crew. Because criminal 
proceedings and interrogations were conducted, a substantial amount of relevant 
material is available in the records of the Council of Justice for 1766. Many of the 
surviving crew members, including Adsistent Olof Leij, a man who was to playa 
prominent role in wresting control of the ship back from the mutineers and enabling 
their recapture, testified before the court, and the records contain detailed 
transcriptions of their testimonies. Those provided by Muller, Gulik and Leij are 
among the most lengthy and comprehensive, and provide much in the way of detail as 
to the events as they occurred aboard the ship, as well as the actions of officers and 
I The Court Minutes for the year 1766 contain details regarding action taken against the skipper of the 
ship and one of his senior officers, as well as two of the slaves who appeared to have been leaders in 
the rebellion. The reference for the minutes is CA CJ 48. Testimonies recorded from the officers and 











crew and the motivations that guided and shaped such actions. However, due to the 
fact that these testimonies were recorded after the events occurred, and present 
particular perceptions of the uprising and wreck of the Meermin that are at least 
partially intended to convince the court of as great a degree of personal innocence as 
possible, they are less illuminating of the specificities of the actions of slaves, crew 
and the Dutch forces on the shore as they occurred day after day, than one is able to 
obtain in other records more suitable for this task. Hence they have assumed 
something akin to a secondary importance in the second chapter of my narrative, 
where the daily progression of events after the ship anchored in the Soetendaal's 
Valleij (the site of the landing and wreck) assumes primary significance, while still 
serving to illumine the nature of and motivations behind specific events and actions as 
they unfolded. 
As far as considering the specificity of the landing and final wreck of the Meermin is 
concerned, the most important source is the letters written both between the site of the 
events and the authorities in Cape Town, as well as those written between Cape Town 
and the Soetendaal's Valleij and between Cape Town and other VOC authorities, 
particularly those stationed in Batavia2. The Landdrost of Stellenbosch and 
Drakenstijn, Le Sueur, despatched letters every couple of days from the Soetendaal's 
Valleij, to which he had travelled in order to oversee the quelling of the uprising and 
the attempt to save the ship and crew, to the Cape, detailing events as he observed 
them from shore. Similarly, once the mutineers had surrendered and the surviving 
sailors had been brought to safety, the officers of the Meermin despatched a missive 
detailing the events on the ship and the eventual surrender of the slaves to the Dutch 
2 The letters written between the Soetendaal's Valleij, the site of the eventual wreck of the Meermin, 
and the Cape, are contained in CA C 516. The outgoing letters from the Cape, despatched both to the 











forces. Contained in this collection of letters are two documents, written by the sailors 
on the ship and flung overboard in bottles, which were recovered by Le Sueur and his 
men on the beach. Such letters, containing the sailors' desperate pleas for assistance 
as well as their plans to thwart the intentions of their captors, are evocative of the 
urgency and almost fantastical circumstances that permeated both the consciousness 
and the resultant actions of the sailors; indeed, one could extend this appraisal to the 
entire range of sources that are contained in the letters, reflecting as they do a 
desperate, rapidly escalating reality of danger and menace. The frequency with which 
Le Sueur wrote to the governing authorities at the Cape is itself a telling indicator of 
the significance that Company officials ascribed to the events of the uprising while it 
was in the very process of unfolding, and the sense of gravity, growing desperation 
and imminent catastrophe conveyed by the letters are, in some ways, as important as 
the factual information that they contain. 
The letters despatched by the Cape government to Le Sueur and the overarching 
authorities in Batavia are perhaps less important, in that they serve to summarise 
much of what recorded in the other sources. However, they also contain instructions 
determined by the Council of Policy and subsequently despatched to the Soetendaal's 
Valleij; these instructions bear further reflections of the serious weight conferred on 
the incident by none other than the supreme governing body of the entire region. 
Written in response to the letters of Le Sueur, and in many cases responding 
affirmatively to his specific requests for assistance and oversight, they illuminate the 
measure of cooperation achieved between these two separate districts of the Cape in 
the face of such a grave disaster, as well as recount the various measures undertaken 
by the Cape government in the hope of securing the release and safe recovery of their 
5 












crew, ship and, it should be noted with some degree of emphasis, their goods. Thus, 
the letters received and despatched by the Cape of Good Hope during the year 1766 
are the best means of obtaining a reliable, regular and chronologically accurate 
account reflecting nature and specificity of the events as they unfolded and the 
charged atmosphere that permeated this little comer of the Cape during this short 
time. For this reason they form my primary source for the second section of the 
narrative, and I make use of other records to supplement and add further detail and 
texture to the material that they contain. 
The third significant primary source to which I have devoted my attention are the 
records of the Council of Policy at the Cape, again primarily for the months February 
and March 1766, but including various other resolutions both predating and 
succeeding this specific time period3• The Council of Policy, the most senior decision-
making body at the VOC settlement at the Cape, adopted a number of resolutions 
during this period directed at resolving the situation in the most effective manner and 
salvaging as much of their equipment and merchandise as possible. Many of these 
resolutions were adopted in response to the letters ofLe Sueur, and their directives are 
contained in the letters despatched from the Cape to the Soetendaal' s V alleij. The 
Council of Policy records also contain the report of Philip van den Berg, a senior 
ship's carpenter who inspected the wrecked vessel and arrived at the conclusion that it 
was irrecoverable, as well as further details relating to the sentencing of Muller and 
Gulik. There is also information relating to previous activity of the Meermin; she had 
been equipped from 1761, and did not suffer the violent misfortune of 1766 while 
celebrating her maiden voyage. As has been mentioned, much of what one reads in 











these records is contained in the letters despatched from the Cape or is reflected 
elsewhere; however, they are useful as records of the decisions undertaken by the 
Council of Policy in relation to the disaster, and reflect the interests and 
preoccupations that Company officials foregrounded while the events were unfolding. 
The frequency of the deliberations are evidence themselves of the immense 
significance of the disaster to VOC operations; and the decisions and actions 
implemented by the Council of Policy are the best reflection of the ways in which the 
Meermin uprising and shipwreck impinged upon, and ultimately damaged, Company 
interests and agendas, and the measures adopted by the Company to alleviate as far as 
possible the effects of such damage, that are available in the historical record. 
The narrative of the Meermin has been documented several times, with varying 
degrees of accuracy and completeness. The ship has sometimes been confused with a 
later vessel, also named the Meermin, which was in operation during the 1780s; thus 
one account, located in the Readers' Digest Illustrated History of South Africa, 
records the events of the uprising and shipwreck, but in a relating illustration makes 
some confusion with a record that relates to the second Meermin. This account is 
brief, but fairly accurate in its rendering ofthe events. However, the ship's log that is 
referred to in the illustration belonged to the second Meermin; no logbook has been 
recovered from the Meermin of 1766, and so no daily log is contained in the historical 
record. In addition to the brief version of the events contained in the Readers' Digest, 
an unpublished narrative has been written by the historian of Dutch rule at the Cape 
and recently published novelist, Dan Sleigh. This narrative, comprising 16 pages and 
written in Afrikaans, provides for a detailed and yet concise summation of the mutiny 
and the subsequent events culminating in the wreck. Sleigh's account relies primarily 
7 
rp{".\r£1" IS COlll :mea 












on the sources that I have mentioned; his narrative is this founded on the actual 
historical record, and is the most complete and comprehensive account that is 
currently in existence. His perspective provides for a helpful balance to the details that 
I have gleaned from the primary sources, and grants one an overarching narrative 
structure that imparts coherence to the tangled myriad of events that are contained 
within the source material. Sleigh's account is thus an additional secondary source 
that draws directly on the primary material to which I have devoted my attention; its 
primary value relies in its chronological and narrative function, one that I have 
employed to cross-reference the actual events that I have derived from the historical 
record, and to include additional material where necessary. His account has also been 
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Chapter 2 
The Meermin was not an exceptional vessel, nor was it, by any means, embarking on 
any particularly unusual or dangerous operation. It was a hoeker, a small, probably 
two-masted multipurpose vessel that had been adapted and rigged for slaving 
expeditions4. Outfitted in Amsterdam in 1761, the Meermin had already engaged in a 
number of slaving expeditions during the years preceding her fatal voyage of 1766. 
Hence, one may suppose, the complacency of the crew, a complacency that was 
ultimately to cost half of them their lives. 
The mutiny and ultimate wreck of the Meermin was enabled, in a number of ways, by 
sickness. The Gesaghebber, Gerrit Christoffel Muller, was not a well man; he claims, 
in his plea before the court penned in the minutes for the Council of Justice in 1766, 
that he had been sick for some time before the mutiny5. This appeal to his own lack of 
well-being as a mitigating factor for his poor performance is apparently his primary 
justification in his plea for a measure of clemency. Whatever degree of seriousness 
this sickness may have entailed, it is clear that the Gesaghebber was not in a fit frame 
of mind or body; and his own lack of willingness or ability to lead his men due to his 
illness is the first indicator of a slackened atmosphere of discipline aboard the ship, an 
atmosphere that could be manipulated towards one favouring the success of an open 
rebellion. 
4 As shall become clear later in the narrative, the Meermin had more than one mast, which would 
indicate that it must have been a two-masted vessel. A hoeker could also have a single mast. For 
technical information on these vessels, see Haalmeijer and Vuik, Fluiten, katten enfregatten, pp. 41-
45. 











It was not only Muller who was suffering in such a manner. On-board illness was 
certainly a common feature in seafaring expeditions of the 18th Century, and any 
infection could rapidly spread among the inhabitants of such a small, enclosed space 
with no natural outlet and little in the way of effective medicinal practice6. So it was 
that the slaves, chained and cooped below deck in conditions of undoubted discomfort 
that are difficult for the present-day observer to imagine, fell prey to some form of 
disease 7• When one takes subsequent events into account, one is tempted to consider 
the possibility that the slaves may have been faking the symptoms of illness in order 
to obtain the degree of freedom necessary to stage a mutiny. No matter how 
convincing such a thesis may appear in the light of the events of the Meermin, it 
would be difficult to substantiate fully in the lack of definitive evidence. The crew, 
and in particular the officers under Muller, were obviously convinced that the slaves 
were ill and in need of some ameliorative treatment. Again one is tempted to 
conjecture, to suppose the possibility that Muller's heart was filled with compassion 
for the large number of those who were sharing a similar condition as that which he 
was suffering himself. Such suppositions aside, it was decided that the slaves could be 
freed of their chains in order for them to gain some fresh air and to recover as much as 
possible8; the Madagascan slave route often experienced large losses of slaves en 
route, and no doubt the officers were determined to preserve as much of what was 
now Company property as was humanly possible9. The slaves were released; the 
wheels were turning, and the conditions necessary for slave mutiny were as ripe as is 
perhaps on a slaving vessel of this era. 
6 Leuftink, Harde heelmeesters: zeelieden en hun doktors in de 18de eeuw, pp. 45-53. 
7 CA CJ 390, f. 1302, Testimony of Gesaghebber Gerrit Christoffel Muller. 
8 Ibid. 
9 See Ravell, "The VOC Slave Trade Between Cape Town And Madagascar, 1652-1795", especially 
pages 36-37 and 56, as well as his historical overview of the slave trade itself. I will be examining 











It was Gesaghebber Muller who authorised the unchaining of the slaves, who were 
subsequently allowed to walk around on decklO. It was his first major blunder, the 
fatal consequences of which he could not possibly have foreseen at the time. The 
Company issued fairly strict regulations regarding the securing of slaves on board 
ship; and while it does allow for slaves to be brought on deck under certain 
conditions, it stresses that such a practice is to be limited, and that on such occasions 
that slaves are brought on deck a careful watch must be maintained at all times ll . The 
document highlights the propensity for slaves to hurl themselves overboard as the 
most pressing concern with regard to them being brought above decks; a concerted 
mutiny is not mentioned, and one can presume that the likelihood of such a fatal turn 
of events had not impressed itself on the writers ofthe document. Certainly, one 
would be inclined to view Muller's decision to free a large number of slaves and 
allow them free movement on deck as a clear breach of Company principle, hence the 
harshness of his sentencing. Granted that he, like many Company officials, would 
have in all likelihood viewed the outbreak of a slave mutiny as a virtual impossibility, 
his decision to allow such uncircumscribed freedom to recently purchased slaves was 
perhaps motivated by the combination of an understandable concern for the 
maintenance of Company property with a lax attitude to the regulations governing 
slaving conduct, a laxness perhaps shaped by his own deteriorating condition. In fact, 
there was a precedent to suggest the possibility of violent insurrection; in 1753, a 
slave mutiny had occurred on the vessel Drie Heuvelen, which was suppressed before 
10 CA CJ 390, f. 1302, Testimony of Gesaghebber Gerrit Christoffel Muller; Sleigh, p. 2. 












the slaves were able to gain control of the ship12. The fact that such a rebellion had 
occurred less than fifteen years previously makes Muller's conduct appear all the 
more foolish. One must presume that, as a Company servant, he considered the slaves 
in his charge as powerless and as mere physical entities incapable of human-
motivated action, despite the historical evidence to the contrary. Muller had 
overstepped the boundaries of acceptable practice; the environment for mutiny had 
been set, with slaves walking the ship of their captors with greater freedom than one 
would expect a responsible captain to have granted them. 
The atmosphere instigated by the actions of Muller were not of themselves sufficient 
for mutiny, although it is a matter of fascinating conjecture whether another form of 
rebellion would have occurred had Commies Crause not embarked on his disastrous 
course of action. If there is a man whose actions propels him beyond the sphere of the 
inept and hurls him headlong into the role of the buffoon, then such a man is Commies 
lohan Godfried Crause. The Readers' Digest Illustrated History of South Africa 
describes Crause as a man who took "Muller's casual attitude" to "ridiculous 
lengths,,13; and while Muller certainly stands out as a captain whose authoritative 
ineptitude created an atmosphere conducive to mutinous violence, Crause has to be 
credited with not only allowing such a mutiny to happen, but also, quite literally, with 
supplying the slaves with the tools they required to turn their dreams of personal 
liberation into a reality. These tools were, naturally, weapons; and it was Crause who, 
deciding that the Madagascan weapons obtained at the purchase of the slaves required 
some maintenance, put forward the idea, in itself no sign of stupidity, that those best 
12 See Ravell, "The VOC Slave Trade Between Cape Town And Madagascar, 1652-1795", pp. 15 and 
38. 
13 Reader's Digest Illustrated History of South Africa, p. 52. While this text is obviously not of great 











qualified to clean Madagascan weapons would be those hailing from Madagascar14. 
The only problem in Crause's scheme was that the only Madagascans in any kind of 
reachable distance were the slaves aboard the Meermin, a group who, one would 
suppose, the Dutch officials may have suspected of harbouring at least some measure 
of resentment or anger. Perhaps such suspicions never entered the head of Crause, in 
which case he is a man whose naivety is almost unbelievable; or perhaps he simply 
did not consider the possibility of violence as one that had the least chance of 
assuming reality. Whatever his mental processes at the time, one can reasonably 
assume that his understanding of the slaves mentality was minimal, and that he must 
have been a man of limited imagination. 
It was Tuesday 18 February 1766, the first truly significant date in the course of this 
unfortunate voyage. Koksmaat Harmen Koops describes how, with the 
Gesaghebber's approval, Commies Crause requested that he bring the weapons up on 
deck for the slaves to clean15. Dan Sleigh explains that some of the slaves had already 
been put to work on board by Muller, who no doubt saw no reason for them to wait 
until arriving at the Cape before being assigned to labour16; he highlights the fact that 
Massavana and some of his contemporaries had been assigned to controlling and 
maintaining the sails. Thus, in addition to their being allowed on deck, the slaves had 
been granted considerable freedom of movement on the ship; instead of being herded 
together under the watchful eye of a VOC officer, as one would have reasonably 
expected, the slaves were distributed around the vessel and had been allowed what 
amounts to a free reign. Such a situation certainly indicates a laissez-faire attitude 
14 CA CJ 390, ff. 1302-l303, Testimony of Gesaghebber Gerrit Christoffel Muller; ff. 1245-1246, 
Testimony of Adsistent Olof Leij; Sleigh, p. 2. All the major sources indicate that Crause organised for 
some ofthe slaves to clean their assegais, with Muller's approval. 
15 CA CJ 390, ff. 1262, Testimony of Koksmaat Harmen Koops. 











amongst the officers, an attitude indicative of a remarkable detachment from reality 
and an absolute absence of suspicion that the slaves may take advantage of their 
radically altered circumstances. 
Harmen Koop brought the weapons, which were in the main Madagascan assegais, 
and Muller and Crause assigned five slaves to clean them under the supervision of 
some sailors17. Crucially, some of the senior officers were present while this 
undoubtedly irregular operation was put under way. Koop describes how Crause had 
disappeared to have a meal after assigning the slaves to this task, and was only to 
appear, to his ultimate detriment, when the attack commenced18. Muller claimed to 
have been gazing out over the sea when he was attacked by the slaves, and stabbed 
severely19. Muller's narrative ofthe events is ofa retiring nature in which he seems to 
be abrogating responsibility; the sense one gets from his own testimony is of an 
entirely passive figure, shattered from his reveries by the point of an assegai. His 
ascription of the responsibility for the disastrous cleaning scheme entirely to Crause is 
equally revealing, for he describes how Crause had wanted the weapons cleaned and 
had engaged the slaves' services on his own account20• He also reiterates the 
debilitating nature of his illness, as though he were unable to effectively intervene 
either in the enactment of this disastrous course of action, or in the violence that 
followed21 • All in all, we are being presented with a picture of Muller, reflected as 
much in his own words as in those of his contemporaries, that is decidedly 
unflattering. In attempting to rescind any responsibility that may have been his, 
17 CA CJ 390, ff. 1262, Testimony of Koksmaat Harmen Koops; CA CJ 390, ff. 1303-1304, Testimony 
of Gesaghebber Gerrit Christoffel Muller; Sleigh, p. 2. 
18 CA CJ 390, ff. 1262, Testimony of Koksmaat Harmen Koops. 
19 CA CJ 390, ff. 1304, Testimony of Gesaghebber Gerrit Christoffel Muller. 
20 Ibid, ff. 1303-1304. 











Muller comes across as someone with a decided lack of control over his own vessel, a 
passive captain scarcely aware of the goings-on aboard his own ship. 
Those of the crew who survived were those who managed to barricade themselves in 
the Constapelskamer, a chamber where they were to spend a good few days. As far as 
one is able to make out, Gesaghebber Muller, Onderstuurman Gulik and Adsistent 
Leij clambered into the chamber through the windows, while a number of others, 
including Hofmeester Harmen Koop and the Bottelier Jan de Leeuw, were to add to 
their number. Gulik, too, had been wounded; he was cut above the eye, which he must 
have obtained in what he describes as a particularly violent struggle22 . Only those who 
had attained the relative safety of the Constapelskamer survived, and it is clear that 
several had suffered wounds of varying degrees. The remainder perished. 
According to Sleigh, Crause was one of the first to be killed, dropped with an assegai 
after emerging to attempt to talk with the now-armed slaves23 • It is difficult to find 
direct references in the testimonies of Muller, Gulik and Leij as to Crause's death, but 
is clear that he perished, along with those members of the crew who were too far from 
the Constapelskamer to make it to safety. Others who perished include 
Onderstuurman Bender and Onderstuurman Albert; it would appear that Gulik was 
the only member of that rank to survive the attack24• The ferocity of the battle itself 
appears to indicate a tremendous anger and rage on the part of the slaves, who seem to 
have demonstrated little consideration for the benefit that might be theirs should they 
preserve the lives of the crew. All members of the crew who did not make it to the 
22 CA CJ 390, ff. 1283-1284, Testimony of Onderstuurman Daniel Carel Gulik; Sleigh, p. 5. It is 
Sleigh who specifies that Gulik had been wounded near the eye; Gulik, in his account, mentions that he 
was wounded, but it is difficult to gamer the specificity of the wound from his words. 
23 Sleigh, p. 4. 











place of safety were stabbed and/or thrown overboard. The slaves may have been 
seizing a most opportune moment for regaining their freedom, but the battle was as 
much a direct assault on their former overlords as it was a bid for liberty. While it 
would reinforce a crass stereotype to over-emphasise the bloodthirstiness of the 
slaves, it is not so impertinent to highlight what was undoubtedly a savage and 
ferocious battle. The intensity of the anger manifested on the Meermin on 18 February 
1766 is certainly difficult to imagine for a contemporary audience not directly 
acquainted with the brutal realities of the slave trade; and perhaps all that one can do 
is note the manifestations of what was not a wholly rational and pre-conceived plan of 
action, but the consequences of a particularly unique set of circumstances that brought 
to the surface those violent and brutal undercurrents that underpinned the practice of 
18th Century VOC-directed slavery in a horrific, and yet at the same time deeply 
revealing, moment of spontaneous slave resistance. As is often the case, the tensions 
and social fractures implicit in an unjust institution were illuminated in all their stark 
actuality through circumstances that allowed the workings of the subconscious to be 
manifested at the level of exterior behaviour. It will be sufficient to conclude that the 
violence of the manifestation is itself testimony to the immense tensions and indeed 
hatreds that girded the slave trade and guided the behaviour of both its promulgators 
and its victims. 
Those crew members who had survived were by now secreted in the 
Constape/skamer, barricaded against the slaves who had assumed control of their 
vessel. There is a rather gory interlude, during which the slaves captured sailors who 
had secreted themselves in the rigging and, after binding them, stabbed most of them 
16 
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to death25 . Of the five who remained, three were hurled overboard after the slaves, led 
by Massavana, cast lots to decide their fate26. Rijk Meyer, who was able to swim, 
managed to grab on to a rope dangling from a window of the Constapelskamer, and, 
avoiding the shots of the slaves, was pulled up to rejoin his fellows27• 
As one could imagine, the crew were in a rather desperate state regarding food and 
water supplies. There were now approximately 30 crew members in the 
Constapelskamer28, and they were forced to subsist on raw bacon and potatoes and a 
cask of arak29. The situation was beginning to look bleak, not to mention the 
increasingly obvious evidence of the inability of the slaves to sail the ship; and, after a 
failed attempt on Wednesday 19th to gain food supplies, things were coming to a head. 
It was at this stage that the crew began to debate the options open to them, a course of 
action that, perhaps as much to their surprise as to that of anybody else, was to 
instigate a series of events culminating in their regaining of their liberty. 
The skipper advocated a course of violent resistance. It was now Thursday, and 
Muller was of the opinion that the crew should arm themselves, break out of the 
Constapelskamer and retake the vesseeo. The sailors evidently possessed some arms 
in their refuge, weapons that must either have been stored there or which the sailors 
25 Sleigh, p. 5. 
26 Ibid, pp. 5-6. 
27 Ibid, p. 6. 
28 There is some confusion in the sources as to the number of sailors who were able to obtain refuge in 
the Constapelskamer. Later in the narrative, I shall describe how two letters written by the sailors 
reached the shore close to where the ship came to be anchored; one of these letters numbers the crew as 
32, while the other gives the total as 30. Sleigh, on the other hand, estimates the number of sailors to be 
not more than 25. The testimonies do not, as far as I can tell, provide details in this regard. The 
respective references are: CA C516, ff. 83-84; Sleigh, p. 6. 
29 CA CJ 390, f. 1286, Testimony of Onderstuurman Daniel Carel Gulik; Sleigh, p. 6. 
30 CA CJ 390, ff. 1230, Testimony of Quartiermeester Jan Herman Toome; Sleigh, p. 6. In the light of 
their reticence to take a lead in such a resistance, it is interesting to note that both Muller and Gulik 











must have been carrying at the time of their dramatic flight to the Constapelskamer. 
Muller himself, due to his injury, was rather conveniently not in the position to 
include himself in the planned offensive, as was Gulik. Despite the obvious 
seriousness of his wound, it is fascinating to note, perhaps too cynically, Muller's 
reticence to directly command any offensive against the mutinous slaves who had 
successfully overrun a vessel under his command. By now, one can begin to observe 
such behaviour as sadly characteristic of the man. His lack of vigilance and decisive 
leadership had created an atmosphere on his ship that had resulted in what must be, 
apart from complete destruction of the vessel, the worst possible disaster that he 
would have been able to imagine; and now he advocated a plan of violent resistance 
in which he refused to playa direct role. The ineptitude and, for lack of a better word, 
passivity of Muller becomes all the more apparent as the narrative continues. 
The armed assault was a complete failure. A Bootsman Laurens Pieters had 
volunteered to lead a group of armed sailors in the wake of Muller's and Gulik's 
professed incapacity to do S031; and they proceeded out of the Constapelskamer, 
shooting at any slave within sight. The slaves fought back; Pieters was brought down, 
followed by another sailor, both of whom were left on the deck32; and another sailor, 
wounded but having managed to retreat with his fellow combatants back to their 
refuge, died surrounded by his fellows33 . Twelve sailors had engaged in the mission; 
the only outcome was that the remnant of the crew was now three men poorer for their 
exertions. 
31 CA CJ 390, f. 1284, Testimony of Onderstuurman Daniel Carel Gulik; Sleigh, p. 7. 
32 CA CJ 390, f. 1247, Testimony of Adsistent OlofLeij. 











Faced with the loss of three of their men, the crew ofthe Meermin were not to be 
deterred. Instead of retiring, they hit upon an even more outrageous plan. Again with 
the affirmation of the captain, they placed some gunpowder beyond the 
Constapelskamer with the intention of igniting it, and thereby terrifying the mutinous 
slaves into submission. This plan was to meet with a similarly dismal end to that 
which had preceded it. Sleigh claims that a Bootsman Gulik was burnt in the face, to 
the extent that he was blind. Gulik's testimony does refer to his being burned by the 
fire when the gunpowder was ignited; however, the extent to which he was injured is 
not altogether clear, or whether any blinding or disfigurement was permanent34• It 
therefore seems likely that Sleigh denoted Gulik with the incorrect rank at this point 
in his narrative. Certainly, one gets a sense that Gulik was enduring more than his fair 
share of hardship, and one cannot help but entertain the notion that at this moment he 
might have considered himself better off lying at the bottom of the sea with his 
erstwhile contemporaries. He must have expressed his unhappiness with the way 
events had turned out, for this course of action was ultimately abandoned. Such a 
heightened atmosphere of tension must have affected the crew, who probably saw 
their repeated attempts at intimidation as endangering their chances of survival to an 
even greater extent than the danger to which they had previously been subjected. 
Needless to say, the failure of both these operations had impressed their true condition 
on the collective consciousness of the crew and officers. Gunfights and explosions 
having led to no significant improvement in their condition, the only option remaining 
was the humiliating, but potentially life-saving course of negotiation. 











The crew were in possession of a slave woman who they had conveniently retained 
when barricading themselves in the Constapelskamer; the Dutch had assigned a 
number of female slaves to the Constapelskamer when loading the slaves in 
Madagascar, and it is clear that a number of these had remained under their authority 
after the uprising35 • This slave woman was to become the primary instrument of 
negotiation between the sailors and the mutinous slaves36• The crew were evidently 
not yet willing to enter into negotiations that would accede to the reality of their 
situation; rather, they initiated proceedings with a perhaps not untypical stream of 
threats and demands. Their experience with the gunpowder having met with a certain 
degree of success, a fact that the upper hierarchy as represented by Gulik was only too 
aware, the sailors demanded the immediate surrender of the slaves37. They threatened 
that, in the absence of such a surrender, they would proceed to blow the ship up with 
their gunpowder38. The evident absurdity of this threat was obviously not lost on the 
slaves, who had been witness to the crew's distinct discomfort at the result of their 
pyrotechnic experiment. Calling their bluff, they answered that they had viewed the 
fear that the explosion had instilled in the sailors, and were not prepared to do what 
was requested ofthem39. Nevertheless, for all their bluster and mock bravado, the 
crew had embarked on a course of action that would ultimately save their lives. The 
slaves wanted to negotiate40; the opportunity for deceit and manipulation was near at 
hand. 
35 Sleigh, p. 2. 
36 CA CJ 390, f. 1306, Testimony of Gesaghebber Gerrit Christoffel Muller. 
37 Ibid; Sleigh, p. 7. 
38 Ibid. 












At this stage we are witness to a shift in overt leadership, a shift that will further 
illuminate the tensions among the officer base. It has been noted that both 
Gesaghebber Muller and Onderstuurman Gulik had been injured; both were severely 
incapacitated, to the extent that they were unable to exert any form of capable 
leadership. Any active contribution to the sailors' preservation would have to be 
undertaken by another, a man more capable than his superiors in both body and mind, 
in securing the confidence of both the crew and the slaves to reach some kind of 
settlement. 
It is thus that Adsistent Olof Leij enters the frame of action as a major player. Sleigh 
refers to him as a c1erk41, while certain subsequent references would indicate that he 
was some kind of Commies, associated with Crause, who had been employed in the 
capacity of slave purchase and management. He would thus have been already 
personally acquainted with the slaves; as such, he would have been the most capable 
candidate in the eyes of the sailors to undertake complex and indeed disastrous 
negotiations of this nature. The sailors would have been fully aware that this was an 
operation in which their lives were at stake; they had failed to defeat the mutineers 
violently, and the slaves had called their rather unconvincing bluff. One ofLeij's 
skills was that he spoke a smattering of Malagasy, the lingua franca of Madagascar, 
the rudiments of which he must have picked up in the course of his career as a slave 
procurer42. The only possibility for obtaining life and liberty were thus secured in his 
hands, as he was assigned the unenviable task of negotiating for his and his 
compatriots lives with those whose possession he had negotiated only a few days 
previously. This time, he was in a less comfortable position in the negotiation process 
41 Ibid, p. 4. 











than that which his previous experience would have enabled him to grow accustomed 
to. 
Leij tends to be a narrator who is rather sparing on the details, and he does not accord 
significant detail in his testimony to the nature of the negotiations that he conducted 
with the slaves. What he is clear about, and what is reiterated by other sources, is the 
demands that the slaves placed on the crew in return for their security. The slaves 
wanted to be returned to Madagascar, to the shores of then island that they still 
considered to be their home 43. This was their demand. The rage that had been 
unleashed when circumstances enabled it had faded somewhat; and while the slaves 
must have felt something a little more intense than animosity towards their one-time 
captors, they now evidently saw the preservation of the enemy's lives as a tool that 
they could employ to their benefit. Looking beyond their immediate anger and rage, 
they saw cooperation with the crew as their best chance of going home, and of 
reversing the terrible misfortune that had befallen them. Hence their willingness, on 
witnessing the botched attempts of the sailors to regain the vessel and their 
subsequent helplessness, to enter into an agreement. 
There would no doubt have been a subconscious desire on the part of all the slaves to 
return to their place of origin and escape the destiny of lifelong servitude that awaited 
them at their destination; indeed, Sleigh refers to Massavana as possessing a distinct, 
articulated desire to obtain some means of returning to Madagascar44• As one of the 
identified leaders of the mutiny, Massavana would no doubt have been at the forefront 
of these negotiations, where he most probably would have articulated the collective 
43 CA CJ 390, f. 1249, Testimony of Adsistent OlofLeij; Sleigh, p. 7; the other testimonies record 
similar details. 











desire on the part of the slaves to return to Madagascar. The slaves made a number of 
demands of Leij; they instructed the crew to return them to their own land, and 
furthermore they instructed that the entire must bring themselves on deck, carrying 
with them their entire store of gunpowder, and that the gunpowder be them thrown 
overboard45 . Leij relayed this series of demands to Muller; and, exhibiting some 
measure of decisiveness at last, Muller hit upon the opportunity for deceit that 
presented itself to him. It had already pressed itself upon the crew that the slaves 
possessed little in the way of seafaring or navigational skills; and it would not have 
appeared outrageous to consider the slaves incapable of being able to locate their 
position within the wide expanse of the ocean. Hence, the possibility to deceive the 
slaves into thinking they were being taken home, while actually sailing for a place of 
refuge that would be more hospitable to the Dutch than to the Madagascans was 
finally given expression, at this juncture, by Muller. Once the sailors were in the 
position to regain control of their vessel, even though under the orders of the 
mutineers, they were to set a course ofN.W., one that they estimated would take them 
to a place of refuge beyond Cape Agulhas, in a vicinity of the Cape with a Company 
presence46. What they had been unable to accomplish through force, the crew were to 
secure with deceit. 
It would appear that Leij assumed a measure of command over the crew on deck, 
while nominally under the authority of the leader of the slaves47• (As will be 
4S CA CJ 390, f. 1249, Testimony of Adsistent OlofLeij; CA CJ 390, f. 1306, Testimony of 
Gesaghebber Gerrit Christoffel Muller; Sleigh, pp. 7-8. 
46 CA CJ 390, f. 1307, Testimony of Gesaghebber Gerrit Christoffel Muller; CA CJ 390, f. 1250, 
Testimony of Adsistent OlofLeij. Sleigh, p. 8. Sleigh who refers specifically to Table Bay, False Bay 
or Saldhana Bay as the intended destination of the crew. Muller, in his account, makes no such specific 
reference, although it is clear that he wanted to bring the ship to a position in the vicinity of Cape 
Agulhas; Leij refers to False Bay and Table Bay as their possible destinations. 
47 CA CJ 390, f. 1307, Testimony of Gesaghebber Gerrit Christoffel Muller; CA CJ 390, f. 1249, 











examined later, the leader of the mutineers is killed on the beach near Cape Agulhas, 
where he was shot dead by a commando; he remains nameless in the historical 
record.) With instructions relayed to him from the Gesaghebber, Leij instructed the 
Stuurman on the course to set; they set sail in a northwesterly direction, in the hope of 
coming across some land48 • Sleigh records that Leij was required to ask the leader of 
the mutineers for approval for any decision he wished to take on deck; the slaves had 
evidently instituted a structure of authority on board, and assumed a level of control 
that stands in stark contrast to that of Muller49. It must have been a source of some 
delight to the slave leaders to so visibly exert such authority over their former captors; 
but, apart from whatever enjoyment it may have instilled in them, it is clear that they 
had organised an internal system of authority and order, and were determined to 
assume control in such a way as to prevent any reversal to their fortunes. Had it not 
been for their evident ignorance in the field of maritime navigation, one gets the sense 
that the sailors would not have been able to pull of their ruse so easily. It was, in many 
ways, largely a matter of a technical expertise lacking among the mutineers that 
enabled the sailors to undermine their intentions; had such expertise been more evenly 
balanced, the outcome of the rebellion would have been far different, entailing vastly 
dissimilar fates for the protagonists of the conflict. 
Leij was also gradually replacing Muller as the authority in the sailors' hierarchy. 
While accepting Muller's guidance, particularly in the practice of the deceit (a deceit 
for which he is ultimately as responsible as is Muller), it was now he who issued 
directives and who assigned both crew and slaves to their particular tasks. Muller's 
authority was gradually being undermined, although not overtly but rather through a 
48 Ibid. 











cooperative arrangement, a kind of coalition of the willing, stemming more from 
Muller's own incapacity to lead than from any attempt on Leij's part to usurp his 
authority; and the sailors, who had been subject to Muller's ineptitude, could very 
well have appreciated an injection of decisive, capable leadership on the part of Leij. 
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At the beginning of March, Johannes Le Sueur, the Landdrost of the District of 
Stellenbosch and Drakenstijn, decided to travel to the Soetendaal's Valleij, a region 
just east of Cape Agulhas that is close to present-day Struisbaai. His journey was 
motivated by a letter that had been despatched to him on the 27 of February by a local 
official named Hentz. The letter detailed a series of events that would have been of 
the utmost concern to a district magistrate. A ship that bore no flag had moored 
offshore; officials on shore having been alerted of such a strange occurrence, a 
commando comprising of local burghers had been assigned to patrol the beach5o• 
These vigilant measures were not to have been taken in vain; a large number of 
slaves51 came ashore in two light vessels, whereupon they were accosted by the 
commando who had been alerted to their presence52• A battle ensued, in which a 
number of the slaves were killed; the remainder had been captured, and were being 
stationed on a neighbouring burgher's farm53 • 
Such a report must have been of significant concern to Le Sueur; indeed, one could go 
so far to say that the import of the letter would have been enough to shock him 
profoundly. The chief official responsible for maintaining law and order in the 
district, he was being faced with an event of unprecedented proportions. Details were 
yet scarce, although it was clear that slaves had successfully instigated a violent 
uprising and forcefully commandeered a VOC vessel; such information must have 
resonated with the fears of any colonial official holding such a position as his, where 
50 CA C 516, ff. 67-69, Letter from Hentz to Le Sueur, 27 February 1766. 
51 The total number of slaves was 70, as later letters from Muller and Leij indicate. See CA C 516, ff. 
90-93, Letter from Muller and Leij to the Cape. 












the prospect of violent rebellion was always a very real possibility to the propagators 
of a system of institutionalised oppression. Not unsurprisingly, Le Sueur considered 
the matter to require the greatest attention that could be accorded it. He thus decided 
that it would require nothing less than his personal attention, and made plans to depart 
for the Soetendaal's Valleij at the greatest possible speed. It would probably be safe to 
say that the events that were to unfold over the next two weeks would comprise the 
most challenging, harrowing and indeed the most strange experience ofLe Sueur's 
career. 
By 2 March he had arrived in the region and installed himself in the home of Barend 
Geldenhuijs, a local farmer54. From Geldenhuijs, he proceeded to the property of 
another burgher, Wessels Wesselsen, on which the recaptured slaves were being 
sheltered55 • At the farm, he observed 18 male slaves, whom he interviewed in order to 
ascertain the situation that prevailed on board the Meermin and that had enabled these 
slaves to row to shore from a vessel on which they were supposed to have been 
secured as prisoners56. The details provided by Le Sueur relating to this interview are 
sketchy, but to the Landdrost newly arrived from Stellenbosch with little idea of the 
cause for such a strange and dangerous occurrence they would have been 
disconcertingly revealing. Through an interpreter, he was led to understand that many 
of the Europeans were ill; a phrase used in the letter translates as "partly dead", 
indicating either that a large number had been murdered, as has been observed, or that 
many were sick to the point that they were approaching death57 • He also records that, 
at sight of land, the slaves had forced the European sailors to approach the shore; 














furthermore, he notes that the slaves gave their total number as 150, of which a 
significant number had remained on the ship58. He further adds that an additional 
amount of 14 slaves, including women, had been recaptured by the commando 59 ; this 
is to be a recurring feature of Le Sueur's correspondence, as he periodically records 
subsequent recapturing of slaves as they occurred sporadically throughout the period 
that he was to reside at the Soetendaal' s Valleij. 
While it is difficult to penetrate Le Sueur's mental world through his letters (which 
possess predominantly factual content, and appear to be intended to appease a 
dissatisfied and distinctly unhappy Cape government), it would be useful at this point 
to consider what an event such as this would have entailed for him. While mutinies 
are by no means unheard of in the VOC era, they are certainly rare; and while a slave 
uprising had occurred in 1753 (referred to above), it had been quelled with relative 
ease, and little in the way of mutinous violence had occurred in the direct vicinity of 
the Cape up to this point. Le Sueur was thus faced with a disaster of unprecedented 
extent, and furthermore a disaster that was yet in the process of unfolding. In addition, 
he was equipped with only the sketchiest of details regarding the actual condition of 
the ship and the crew as well as the events that had culminated in the fatal overthrow 
of a VOC-mandated authority. All he knew was that slaves from Madagascar, who 
had been bound for the Cape, had risen up, murdered many of the crew and 
commandeered the vessel; and, to his even greater stupefaction, they had weighed 
anchor off Cape Agulhas and come ashore. This very fact that the slaves had come 
ashore must have been something of a mystery to Le Sueur, who would have found it 













their vessel in the very territory governed by those whose official representatives had 
negotiated their enforced state of servitude. Of course, it is more a matter of 
speculation than of actual historical investigation to decipher of what Le Sueur's 
internal state would have comprised. Suffice to say that, in the light of his own 
testimony regarding the gradually unfolding nature of events that were being made 
known to him, and taking into account the magnitude of the Meermin mutiny and the 
significance such a disaster must have entailed for a legal official of the VOC, one can 
surmise that he would have been somewhat daunted by the task that presented itself 
before him. As subsequent letters demonstrate, his frequent and detailed 
correspondence with the Cape government, and his repeated requests for assistance 
and advice, allow one to construct an admittedly sketchy portrait of a senior official 
who displays a sense of acute discomfort, a man inhabiting a situation in which he is 
somewhat out of his depth. As shall be demonstrated further, he is very much a 
spectator to the outrageous events of which he, on the landward side, is chief witness; 
and one cannot but possess some sympath  for a man confronted with such a 
gargantuan challenge. Only as days went by and events began to unfold would he 
begin to grasp more firmly what had brought this strange, violent episode to the 
shores of his territory; and the circumstances that lead up to his being able to piece 
together the story of the mutiny are themselves as surprising and unbelievable as any 
others that have been here recorded. 
By 3 March, Le Sueur had arrived at the farm of yet another burgher, Matthijs Rostok, 
who owned land near the beach of the Soetendaal's Valleij6o. The participation and 
cooperation of the local farmers and white citizenry becomes more and more evident 











as one progresses through Le Sueur's correspondence. At this stage it will suffice to 
say that Le Sueur was relying heavily, if not completely, on local farmers, both for 
hospitality and for physical aid in the recapture of the landed slaves; and that the 
rescue operation that he would ultimately oversee was not a VOC-dominated 
manoeuvre facilitated by officials and workers of the Company, but rather was a 
cooperative venture heavily reliant on the local farmers for manpower and expertise. 
When he reached the beach, Le Sueur was able to view the ship for the first time. He 
estimated the vessel as being anchored one hour off shore and out of any immediate 
danger61. On the beach he found the "barcas" and the "schuit", the two landing 
vessels employed by the 70 slaves to come ashore, of which the former was deeply 
buried in the sand62. A sailor, who had been picked up by a commando on the beach, 
was also brought to Le Sueur; he had come ashore with the slaves, and had managed 
to escape once they had reached the beach63 • He claimed that he had the intention to 
proceed with all speed to the Cape, but that, due to some problems with his legs, he 
was unable to do this64. Having gained all the useful information that he could from 
him, Le Sueur despatched him to the Cape to report to the governing authorities65 . 
With some knowledge as to the nature of the uprising and the condition ofthose 
remaining aboard the vessel, Le Sueur was forced to wait on the beach until he could 
devise some means of approaching the Meermin and, either by negotiation or by 
force, securing the release of the crew. Significantly, there was no boat suitable 
enough to mount any kind of naval offensive in the vicinity; and in order to proceed 
with any definitive plan, one of the Meermin's own landing vessels, now on the 
















At some stage after the original party of slaves had gone ashore, the slaves who had 
remained on board decided to try and find out exactly where they were situated. To do 
this, they constructed a raft from some wood, and sailed to the shore66. On their 
return, they informed the slave body that they were indeed in Madagascar; they had 
seen a black sheep herder, but he had fled before they had been able to communicate 
with him67• This was a stroke of good luck for the crew; had the slaves been able to 
catch the sheep herder and attempt to speak with him, they would have come back 
possessing a vastly different frame of mind. As shall be seen, it was as much sheer 
luck as it was ingenuity on their part that ultimately enabled them to survive their 
ordeal and escape a wrath that the slaves, had they known their true situation, would 
most definitely have exhibited towards them. 
At this stage there is a significant gap in the correspondence, with no relevant letter 
reaching the Cape between 3 March, when he first inspected the beach, and the 7th . In 
the meantime, the Cape had not been idle in responding to Le Sueur's missives. A 
decision was undertaken in the Council of Policy to embark on two actions. Firstly, on 
March 3 they despatched two hoekers, the Nepthunus and the Snelheijd, with a 
Sergeant, 2 Corporals and 25 soldiers, to provide naval assistance in the defeat of the 
mutineers and the recovery of the Meermin68• There is little that one can say about this 
expedition, precisely because by the time these vessels reached the Soetendaal's 
Valleij the action was all over. The vessels had struggled to find the precise location 
of the Meermin's anchorage, and sailed up and down the coast while Le Sueur was 
66 CA C 390, f. 1291, Testimony of Onderstuurman Daniel Carel Gulik. 
67 Ibid; CA C390, f. 1174, Testimony of Bottelier Jan de Leeuw. 
68 CA C 144, ff. 125-139, Resolutions of the Council of Policy, 28 February 1766; C1681, ff. 26-29, 











struggling to obtain some means of rescuing the Europeans held captive. By the time 
the hoekers reached the Soetendaal's Valleij, all had been resolved, upon which 
receiving such news they sailed back to the Cape 69. Where naval power may have 
provided a different denouement to that which shall ultimately be witnessed, 
conditions prevented the narrative from assuming this particular shape. As with so 
much in this account, luck and chance are by no means minor players; arguably, 
circumstance is the true author of the form that this account ultimately assumes. 
The second action undertaken by the Cape was to despatch, by land, three ship's 
carpenters led by Philip van den Berg, the head of the ship's carpenters on the 
Company Wharf at Cape Town, as well as 2 "stuurlieden"(pilots), a quartermaster and 
20 sailors7o• This party, having left on March 4, was to reach the Soetendaal's Valleij 
without the navigational difficulties that were obviously experienced by the 
Nepthunus and the Snelheijd. While most of this body were to remain spectators to the 
events that were to follow, the ship's carpenters were to provide much-needed 
assistance to Le Sueur, an assistance that would indirectly shape the uprising's 
culmination. 
On the 7th, Le Sueur resumes his correspondence with the Cape to recount a 
remarkable series of events that had begun on the 6th. He refers to the carpenters as 
inspecting the "barcas" and the "schuit" on the 6 March, indicating that they had 
arrived by this date and were engaging themselves with examining the Meermin's 
landing craft with the intention of repairing them in order to invade the vessel by 
69 For information regarding the Nepthunus and the Snelheijd, see the summary of the Meermin 
ufrising that is contained in CA C 1682, ff. 92-104. 
7 CA C 144, ff. 154-159, Resolutions of the Council of Policy, 6 March 1766; C 1681, ff. 43-46, Letter 
from the Cape to the Soetendaal's VaUeij. According to the summary contained in C 1682, ff. 92-104, 











sea7l . He had descended to the beach to examine these operations, when he was 
approached by a "Hottentot" carrying a bottle in his hand72. Inside the bottle was a 
letter, signed by the Bottelier Jan de Leeuw on behalf of the crew73 . Even more 
unexpectedly, this find was supplemented by another, also a bottle containing a letter, 
this one signed by OlofLeif4 • Evidently the letters had been written by these two 
officers, placed and sealed in the bottles and tossed overboard with the hope that they 
would be discovered by allies on the coast. The sheer improbability of even one bottle 
being recovered on the shore in such a fashion must be evident to even the most 
imaginative observer; the fact that both reached the shore in fairly close proximity to 
one another, and were both discovered by their intended recipients, is truly 
remarkable 75. 
Both letters were, in effect, pleas for help. However, they did not merely beg for any 
measure of assistance that those on shore could devise from their own efforts. Rather, 
both the letters enjoined a particular plan of action that the sailors felt could enable 
their escape, but that relied for its success on the cooperation of friendly forces on the 
shore. After briefly detailing the violent uprising and the decision by 70 of the slaves 
to journey to shore76, details with which Le Sueur was naturally already acquainted, 




75 In an event that is certainly not lacking in surprising circumstances and eventualities, the secretement 
of letters in bottles that are thrown overboard and then actually found by friendly forces on the shore 
reads like something from an adventure yam or a fantastical seafaring narrative along the lines of 
Treasure Island or Sindbad the Sailor. The fact that such an imaginative gesture was actualised in 
reality is testimony to history's recurring propensity to surprise and, although it may be too strong an 
expression for a case as ultimately tragic as this, to delight. 
76 It is in these letters that one first reads that the number of slaves who left the vessel totalled 70; it is 
also here that one is provided with contradictory estimates of the total number of crew who had 
managed to reach the Constapelskamer during the uprising. Leij claims that 30 crew members survived 











both letters outline what the crew requires of their landward allies 77. In effect, both 
letters requested that three fires be lit on the shore; they claim that the "Swarten", a 
term commonly used by the Europeans when referring to the slaves ("Neegers" is 
another commonly employed term used in similar fashion; the racial connotations of 
both expressions are obvious), do not know about the presence of local farmers in the 
area, and that if these fires are lit the slaves will bring the Meermin close to shore78 . 
Little else, in the way of information or supplication, is provided; and Le Sueur, 
dumbfounded as he must have been at the improbable means by which he had arrived 
at this direct communication from the stranded crew, was forced to act on little more 
than faith. His own letter of March 7 describes his ambivalence towards the sailors' 
requests, and of he struggled to interpret a reasonable explanation for an appeal that 
he no doubt found to be somewhat bizarre79• In possession of only the barest of 
details, knowing that some of the slaves had already come ashore but unaware of the 
intentions of those who remained aboard or of the motivations of the crew in making 
this supplication, he was forced to consider his next move in what might be 
considered an epistemological vacuum. No request for advice from the Cape would be 
of much benefit; he evidently noted the urgent tone discernable in both letters, and 
realised that he would have to act quickly and decisively. It is probable that it was this 
very urgency on the part of the crew as expressed in their writing, an urgency that 
evokes an atmosphere of such desperation that a plan as outrageous as this could be 
considered, that ultimately decided Le Sueur's hand. He decided to light the three 
fires as requested. Early in the morning on March 7, the fires were lit on the beach 
77 CA C 516, ff. 83-84, Letters from de Leeuw and Leij. In a later letter written by Muller and Leij to 
the Cape, they claim that they observed the fIres the morning after they had thrown the bottles 
overboard. As the fIres were lit on the morning of March 7, it is probable that the crew wrote the letters 
on the 6th of March. 
78 Ibid. 











where they would be easily visible from the Meermin80• Shortly after the fires had 
achieved a strength and brightness significant enough to be viewed from the vessel, 
those on the shore witnessed the Meermin being set towards the beach and sailing to a 
position that Le Sueur estimated to be a musket shot from their vantage point on the 
shore8l • It was the first time that the ship had altered position since it had first entered 
the bay and dropped anchor. Evidently, the lighting of the fires had produced its 
desired effect; what was not yet clear to Le Sueur and his contemporaries was how 
and why the ship was moved to a position of such increased vulnerability to attack 
than that which it had previously occupied. 
As events were to tum out, from this moment Le Sueur had to do very little but wait; 
it is almost as if events garnered their own momentum, a momentum that became 
possessed of the inevitability and catastrophic destiny of an epic tragedy. After the 
ship had dropped anchor, those on shore observed some figures on the Meermin 
chopping down one of the ship's masts82 . Whatever surprise this action might have 
caused was soon to be eclipsed by the events that were to follow. A sailor swam to 
shore and, on arriving at the beach, was brought to Le Sueur83 . What this sailor had to 
tell provides further fascinating detail into the means by which the crew had been able 
to manipulate the plans of the captors in such a way as to ultimately bring about their 
downfall. The sailor, who remains nameless in the correspondence but who de Leeuw 
names Rijk Meyer, claimed that he had been sent ashore by the slaves to ascertain 















ashore a few days earlier) might be on shore84• However, his intentions went far 
beyond satisfying the demands of the mutineers. Prior to his departure from the 
vessel, he had made a secret agreement with the crew that, should he discover friends 
on the shore who were able to provide assistance, he would provide a signal to his 
fellows on board to indicate to them that the opportunity for their rescue was near at 
hand85 . The means of this signal is not detailed in the correspondence, but de Leeuw 
and Sleigh describe how Meijer had agreed to wave a handkerchief around his head as 
a means of signalling his fellow sailors86• The irony of this situation is rather striking. 
Both groups aboard the Meermin, the slaves and the crew, hoped that their 
compatriots were at hand; and yet while one sense of expectancy was based on an 
accurate knowledge of circumstances and of the actual location of the Meermin, the 
other was founded on a misguided fantasy that had been fuelled both by deceit and by 
a devastating lack of formal knowledge and capability, a lack that had made this very 
deceit possible. It was ultimately within the sphere of knowledge that the decisive role 
in the entire affair was played; and it was this strange mixture of accuracy and 
misjudgement, of a realistic assessment of geography and circumstance and a fantasy 
that had been fuelled by eager hope and cruel deceit, that charges the entire narrative 
with a particularly tragic irony. 
The signal was given, upon which a canoe was lowered from the Meermin and guided 
towards the shore87• In the canoe were six mutineers and one of the sailors, who were 
viewed to be rowing towards a high sand dune where, coincidentally, a commando 
84 Ibid; CA CJ 390, f. 1175, Testimony of Bottelier Jan de Leeuw. 
85 CA C 516, ff. 79-82, Letter from Le Sueur to the Cape, 7 March 1766. 
86 CA CJ 390, f. 1175, Testimony of Bottelier Jan de Leeuw; Sleigh, p. 11. 











had been posted88. The letter details the following events as the inadvertent result of a 
bungling of orders, albeit a bungling that was largely inevitable. The commando had 
been ordered to hide in the eventuality of a landing party approaching from the 
vessel89. As the Meermin was now only a short distance from the shore, it would no 
doubt have been in the interests of the Dutch to conceal their presence and thereby not 
alert the mutineers to their presence and thus disclose their error to them. Such an 
eventuality would undoubtedly lead to an aggressive response on their part, giving 
rise to a sudden desperation, and would likely culminate in a violent finale. Le Sueur 
does not specifically claim that he had issued this order; but his emphasis on it having 
been given, particularly in the light of what ensued when it was, by virtue of 
circumstance, discarded, can be viewed as an attempt on his part to absolve himself of 
responsibility through emphasising the measures that had been adopted to prevent just 
such a setback form occurring. As it was, the canoe approached the sand dune at such 
a rapid rate that the commando was provided with no opportunity to conceal 
themselves9o• As a result, they were forced to attack the mutineers as they stepped out 
of the canoe onto the sand91 . A short battle ensued that was fierce enough to result in 
death and injury, as well as to alert both Le Sueur and his cohort on the shore and the 
sailors and slaves who were still aboard the Meermin92• One slave was shot dead, 
while another was wounded and two were taken prisoner; two were unaccounted for, 
one of whom had managed in the confusion to swim away and one who simply could 
not be found and was considered either to have drowned or to have swum back to the 

















commando, and one can therefore presume that all of the European combatants 
survived the skirmish unscathed. If these brief details are anything to go by, it would 
seem that the slaves, expecting to find themselves in friendly and familiar territory, 
were taken by surprise by the commando, despite the fact that the burghers had been 
unable to conceal themselves. Thus disadvantaged, and coupled with the fact that they 
would have been significantly outnumbered, it was a brief and sudden defeat that the 
commando inflicted on the slaves, and one whose ultimate significance they could not 
have foreseen at the moment that they were thus engaged. In the aftermath of the 
skirmish, one of the sailors who had come ashore identified the dead slave as none 
other than the leader of the mutineers94. Such a definitive identification is some 
indication that Massavana was not considered, at least by the crew, to be the leader of 
the mutineers, although other documentary evidence situates him and Koesaij as 
highly significant players. Unfortunately, this leader remains nameless in the 
historical record; thus the coordinator of one of the most significant events in 18th 
Century South African history has passed into posterity with not so much as an initial. 
Nevertheless, one could certainly point to this skirmish as the ultimate deciding factor 
that sealed the fate of the mutineers and enabled the Dutch, both on shore and on the 
Meermin, to gain the initiative; a fact that must have been all too apparent to the 
remaining mutineers, who proceeded to give vent to their displeasure. 
Le Sueur and his men could now hear sounds of violent conflict carried across the 
waters from the Meermin lying a short distance away95. It must have been clear to 
them that the skirmish on the beach had alerted the mutineers to their presence, the 













they had been deceived. It is difficult to grasp the complete shock and sense of 
helplessness and defeat with which the mutineers must have reacted on seeing their 
fellows defeated by a large force of white men, who they would naturally and 
correctly have associated with their original captors. Until this moment, the slaves still 
on board were firmly of the belief that they had arrived at their own country; the fact 
that they had despatched a canoe on the word of a sailor who, it was now evident, had 
been involved with his fellows in double-crossing them, is testimony to the extent to 
which they had been deceived. On witnessing the subsequent battle, and possibly the 
death of their leader as well (it is difficult to ascertain the likelihood of their having 
been able to witness such detail, but as the ship was certainly close to the beach this is 
not an eventuality that can be completely discounted), they would have been 
forcefully confronted with the stark reality of their situation, one that would have 
effected a radical alteration of consciousness and provoked a sense of collective 
desperation. What one is witness to here is a profound shift in consciousness that must 
have taken place in a matter of minutes, one that revealed to the slaves that they had 
been duped and that they had no means of escape. Faced with such a horrifying, 
completely unforeseen reality, the slaves did what perhaps one could only have 
expected of those finding themselves in such a position: they aggressively attacked 
those responsible for deceiving them so heartlessly, who of course happened to be the 
crew. A fantasy in which they had placed their hope had been revealed to be a 
chimera; and the subsequent battle is thus in many respects similar to that in which 
they had gained control of the vessel, in that its dominant emotive content was the 
expression of anger and rage, governed by a terrible sense of powerlessness towards 
the agents of their deceit. 
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Le Sueur heard the sounds of battle taking place on the Meermin, and describes how 
the air would be continuously pierced with the sounds of gunfire96• It had also become 
clear to him that the Meermin had become wedged in such a manner that it was no 
longer capable of movement in any direction. He devised that the ship must have 
become lodged on a sandbank; this was confirmed by one of the sailors who had 
made it to shore, who described the vessel as "digt", or closed, indicating that indeed 
it had become immobile97• The attempt at deceive the mutineers into coming ashore 
and into the hands of the Dutch having been thwarted, Le Sueur and his compatriots 
were left with one advantage, this being the fact that the Meermin was incapable of 
sailing away beyond their reach. In effect, they had a captive target aboard the ship. 
Their one exceeding disadvantage, a circumstance that was only too evident to him, 
was that there existed no able means to board the Meermin due to their lack of 
adequate sea transportation. Le Sueur and his men had no idea what damage the 
mutineers might do both to the crew and to the vessel itself now that they had been 
made aware of their true condition; and his sense of urgency is reflected in his letter 
of the 7th, in which he asks for advice from the Cape and describes how he is engaged 
in repairing the "schuit" for the purpose of invading the Meermin98• In effect, until 
such repairs were completed, Le Sueur had little option but to wait and hope for the 
best. 
As it turned out, Le Sueur's concerns turned out to have been misplaced. The rapidly 
escalating situation aboard the Meermin was defused not by any effort on his part, but 
rather by the initiative of the sailors, who were in a position more ably suited to an 














their experiencing the rather intense pressure of the slaves' anger more keenly than 
their allies on shore. Le Sueur was to playa role in this epic event's conclusion in 
much the same way as he had been during the entire account, acting as little more 
than a spectator bound by the whims of chance and circumstance. 
By the 9th, the "schuit", which had been worked on continuously by van den Berg and 
the two carpenters, was deemed to be in a suitable enough condition to attempt an 
invasion of the Meermin99• Had such an invasion occurred, it would undoubtedly have 
made for some gripping reading; but circumstances were such as to provide the 
historian with a rather more staid finale. While Le Sueur was overseeing the readying 
of the "schuit", the Commies and the Onderstuurman, together with some other 
members of the crew, approached the shore in yet another canoe, albeit one that bore 
what would be a more successful delegation than that borne across these same waters 
two days previouslylOO. By Commies one can presume Le Sueur is referring to Leij, as 
Crause was obviously in a state that precluded him from including himself in such an 
activity, and because various documents seem to indicate Leij as the Commies 101 ; 
while Muller, in his testimony, claims that Gulik went ashore at this point with Leij 
and a "scheeps jongetje", indicating that it was Gulik and Leij who were in the 
canoe 102. The news brought by these men must have come as a tremendous relief, for 
one gets the impression from his frantic letters that had events adopted a more 
dangerous course Le Sueur would have made a reluctant hero. The slaves had viewed 
the readying ofthe "schuit", and could foresee the intentions of those on the beach; 
realising that the end of their wild bid for freedom was near at hand, a more rational 
99 CA C 516, ff. 86-89, Letter from Le Sueur to the Cape, 9 March 1766. 
100 Ibid. 
101 In Le Sueur's letter of the 7th, he refers to Leij's letter as being written by a Commies. See CA C 
516, ff. 79-82. 











spirit assumed shape where rage had previously prevailed, and the slaves handed 
themselves over willingly to the sailors103 • On grasping the proximity of their 
approaching defeat, the slaves would have abandoned their violent tactics as much in 
the interest of self-preservation as from any sudden loss of resolve. The imminence of 
their recapture must have impressed upon them the magnitude of their actions, as well 
as the extent of the retribution that they could reasonably expect the Dutch to consider 
suitable for the violence and immense losses perpetrated by them on VOC personnel 
and property. In such a frame of mind, it is likely that the slaves decided that minimal 
further resistance would be in their best interests, and surrendered themselves in the 
hope of a degree of future clemency. 
With the surrender of the slaves, Le Sueur's agitation would finally have been eased. 
For two traumatic weeks he had been casting around, anxiously seeking guidance 
from Cape officials and desperately seeking to obtain some means of reaching the 
vessel so as to prevent what could easily have erupted into a wholesale massacre. As 
it was, direct intervention on his part had not been necessary; the uprising had fizzled 
out, in a relatively bloodless settlement for which he must have been entirely grateful. 
Not a man who appears given to a love of excitement or adventure, he had been 
relieved of undertaking any violent invasion, with the negotiated surrender providing 
a neat and tidy conclusion to what is otherwise a fantastic and yet a sordid affair. All 
that now remained was the mopping-up operation; an exercise that was to prove 
something of an additional challenge, albeit one that lacked the imminent sense of 
violent disaster that had characterised those that had preceded it. 











The slaves had surrendered on 9 March, and the foremost task that confronted the 
Dutch was to transport them to shore and secure them in an adequate location. While 
the "schuit" had been repaired, it was deemed not suitable because the weather had 
turned and the sea was becoming increasingly rough104• In fact, the Stuurman had 
attempted to reach the Meermin, but the boat had become swamped and he was pulled 
back by a rope that connected the boat with the beach105. It was put forward, most 
probably by the ship's carpenters, that this boat would only be able to be repaired 
thoroughly in a dry dock which, given the remoteness of the Soetendaal' s Valleij and 
its lack of formal infrastructure, would have proved to be an impossible task106. The 
"barcas", as has been mentioned, was buried so deeply as to be irrecoverable in the 
limited time required for the transport of the slaves, and the canoes that had been 
brought to shore were far too small to be adequate for the transportation of such a 
large congregation ofpeople107• A compromise had to be devised; and so it was that 
the burghers, who had played such a prominent and, in the eyes of the Dutch, 
exemplary role in facilitating Le Sueur's efforts, were engaged in another cooperative 
venture. Without any suitable boats, it was decided that the only option would be to 
assist the slaves through the surf manually, and so bring them safely on to the 
beach108. Volunteers were asked for, and the detachment that was thus formed 
comprised in large part oflocal farmers 109• Apart from other important considerations, 
this willingness demonstrates that many of the local farmers were thus able to swim; 

















with the movements of waves and currents, and the farmers who volunteered must 
have been capable of some dexterity within the water. 
A rope was anchored to the shore, and the volunteers swam with it out to the ship 
where they passed it to the crewl1o. Many of the slaves were unable to swim, hence 
the need for a large volunteer contingent to ferry them to shore. The ship, of course, 
was not far from the shore, and furthermore it was low tide; both circumstances 
considerably eased the process and limited the danger of drowning or injury. The 
crew helped the slaves one by one into the water, where volunteers assisted them, 
carrying them if necessary when slaves were completely unable to swim, and drew 
themselves and their human cargo to the shore by means of the rope that linked the 
Meermin with the beachl11. One could metaphorically conceive of this rope as a 
lifeline or an umbilical cord, an image of the rebirth of the crew as they prepared to 
step ashore after close to three harrowing weeks of captivity and imminent death; but 
one can equally suppose, not unreasonably, that few of the participants in this venture 
were given to meditations of the symbolic at this point in time. 
Le Sueur totals the number of slaves recovered as 53, comprising both genders and 
including a number of children, who are described as being carried on the backs of the 
volunteers to the beach 112. A fire was stoked for them on the beach, and they were 
brought refreshments l13 ; such a description cannot but conjure up images of a 
dignified tea party, perhaps an organised reunion, in which the guests of honour 















the hosts. What is evident from this good treatment is the importance that Le Sueur 
and Muller (who had come ashore, together with his crew, after the slaves had been 
successfully transferred to the beach) placed on preserving the strength, and hence 
future profitability, of what was now once again Company property. Now that the 
slaves had effectively been disempowered of any further means of resistance, they 
could now be considered as the physical objects of labour for which they had been 
purchased. The brief flame of personal agency, which had impressed on the crew all 
too clearly the humanity of the Madagascan slaves, had been extinguished; from this 
moment, one learns little about their fate. They were divided into two groups and 
allocated to separate farmers for temporary accommodation; in the meantime, three 
wagons were organised for their transport to the Cape l14 . By the 12th of March, the 
slaves had been sent back to Cape Town. 
Now that disaster had been averted and the traumas ofthe past two weeks had been 
brought to a satisfactory conclusion, Le Sueur and the Cape authorities were anxious 
to piece together what had been occurring on the vessel while such a great deal of 
drama had been taking place on shore. This they were able to do, although to a limited 
extent, now that the crew had been recovered. Both Muller and Leij had reached shore 
safely, where the former was noted by Le Sueur to be visibly wounded, indicating that 
his injuries had been of a serious enough nature as to be unable to heal sufficiently 
while he had been on the MeerminJl5. These senior officers now safely on shore and 
able to enjoy an environment of greater comfort than that which they had been forced 













the Cape, providing some much-desired detail as to the cause of their misfortune and 
to the rile they had played in securing the surrender of the slaves and their release. 
Perhaps nor surprisingly, Muller and Leij provide little detail about the mutiny itself, 
and absolutely nothing regarding the environment on board ship that had enabled such 
a rebellion to take place. This glaring omission surely has something to do with their 
own culpability, particularly on the part of Muller, in enabling the uprising to be 
realised. Maybe they had agreed to bide their time, hoping to devise some explanation 
or excuse that would cohere with the events and that would have minimised any 
retributive action that the Cape officials may have entertained as suitable punishment. 
In the end such intentions, if they existed, did not payoff in any satisfactory fashion. 
On sighting land on the 25th of February, the slaves demanded that the anchor be 
dropped, making clear their intentions to proceed ashore 116. The crew had been 
hoping to reach a region where there was a greater chance of decisive intervention by 
VOC forces, such as Table Bay or False Bay; as it was, they were forced to anchor 
just off what they recognised to be Cape Agulhas, near a region that they must have 
inferred was populated in the main by farmers. It was not ideal, but the slaves were 
determined; furthermore, the sailors realised that a chance whereby they might be 
relieved had indeed presented itself to them, and they thus reinforced the mutineers' 
notion that this was indeed the coast of Madagascar. So it was that 70 slaves went 
ashore, to meet ultimately with imprisonment and death; the crew, except for the 
sailor who was forced to accompany the expedition and was ultimately picked up by a 











commando, remained on board under the watchful eye of the mutineers 117. The 
agitation of both slaves and crew was further aggravated when one of the anchor 
ropes broke, impressing upon them the danger of shipwreck1l8. A further plan was 
evidently necessary in order to save their lives and, say Muller and Leij in their report, 
the ship's goods, although one suspects that they inserted this concern for the 
merchandise in order to ingratiate themselves with the Company officials who they 
would be reading their report, and that they were in fact a great deal more preoccupied 
with the former concern than they were with the latter119• The growing desperation of 
their situation gave them cause to devise a plan of unusual proportions; they decided 
to attempt some means of communicating with any potential who may be on the 
shore, requesting that they light three fires in the hope that it would convince the 
mutineers that their fellows were safe and content, encamped on the shore, and so 
motivating them to bring to bring the ship to a distance close enough to the shore for 
the crew to attempt some means of escape12o. As has been noted, de Leeuw and Leij 
wrote separate letters that detailed the same request, the letters were inserted in bottles 
and the bottles were thrown overboard in the hope that they would be carried to shore 
and discovered by a party able to intervene on their behalf 121. In effect, the crew were 
engaging in a massive act of faith. 
A faith evidently not misplaced, for on the 7th they observed three fires on the 
beachI22. Probably as much to their astonishment as to their relief, they realised that 

















bottles and thereby been alerted to their situation. Perhaps fearing that some 
unforeseen eventuality may yet scare the slaves into removing the vessel from the 
region, or perhaps simply desperate enough, now that they had proof of the close 
proximity of friendly forces, to regain their liberty as soon as possible, they cut the 
anchor rope and set the vessel towards the beach 123. Out of fear that the ship would 
lose its balance in what must have been an increasingly rough and turgid sea, they 
also proceeded to chop down on of the masts in the hope that it would rectify any 
instability in the vessel's motion124• As it turned out, they were unable to save the 
Meermin by this dramatic attempt; the ship became lodged in a sandbank, and would 
ultimately be irrecoverable. 
Of course, the slaves were now able to view the coast in far greater detail than they 
had been able to do previously; and, after their leader had met with such an 
ignominious and for them tragic death, they realised their error and attacked the 
crew125. The rest has been described. The crew having negotiated the surrender of the 
slaves, they were brought to shore and transported back to the Cape. Muller and Leij 
add that seven members of the remaining crew were either ill or wounded, a number 
that one can presume to include both Muller and Gulik. 
On the 30th of October 1766, Muller and Gulik were tried for negligence and for 















Both were demoted, which entailed.being deprived of rank and wages127. Muller was 
forbidden from serving in the VOC for the remainder of his life, and was banned from 
the Cape, while both were to be put on the first ship returning to the Netherlands 
where they would serve for their passage128. Furthermore, both were to lose one 
month's wages and were to pay the costs of the case129• The severity of the sentence, 
particularly in the case of Muller, bears testimony to the significance that the 
Company officials gave to the disaster. Although neither Muller nor Gulik had been 
directly responsible for the loss of the Meermin, they were deemed culpable for 
enabling a situation to arise whereby the Company lost a good number of sailors, a 
portion of recently purchased slaves and, perhaps most important from a fiscal and 
commercial perspective, a vessel that would cost a great deal of time and money to 
replace. Muller's career in the seafaring world of the VOC was effectively over, and it 
remains a matter of conjecture as to the employment that he undertook after his return 
to the Netherlands. It is possible that he would have served on a vessel flying under a 
different flag, although it is equally probable that he opted for another means of 
supporting himself, one that would have been less likely to cause similar grievous 
injuries to those that he suffered in 1766. Whatever it was that he did, one cannot help 
but consider it unlikely that he ever opted to partake in a slaving expedition again; or, 
in the remote chance that he did, that he was sure to keep himself well and active, 
avoiding any chance of contracting an illness such as that which instigated the events 
that had so nearly cost him his life. 
The slaves were not criminally charged; and, with the exception of Massavana and 














population at Cape Town. Massavana and Koesaaij were despatched to Robben 
Island, there to be observed in the hope, so the records say, of shedding further light 
on the matter130• The Dutch authorities evidently did not possess enough in the way of 
direct evidence to convict these two slaves in a criminal court, and so they settled on 
surveying their behaviour and attempting thereby to attain some clarity as to their role 
in the mutiny. These two figures remain something of a mystery, as representatives of 
this group of mutinous slaves, the primary agents and ultimate victims of this tragedy, 
who are yet difficult to penetrate by means of the historical record. Nevertheless, it is 
possible to examine, through a balanced reading of secondary material as well as a 
close exploration of certain features of the narrative, certain historical patterns and 
tendencies that are present in their actions, as well as in those of the crew. A 
considered historical appraisal of the social structures and individual actions of both 
crew and slaves in the light of additional, historically-based material is necessary to 
come to grips with a case of this complexity; and it is to such an analysis that I now 
turn. 












So it was that the violent and tragic affair was brought to what amounts to a fairly 
neat and conclusive finale. It is almost as if the various players had been acting 
according to a particularly imaginative script, and were subject to the whims of a 
capricious and yet enlightening narrator capable of evoking an entire panorama of 
human behaviour and motive. Indeed, if the events here recorded were in fact a work 
of fiction, it may well have constituted a masterpiece of the tragicomic. 
Yet it is not the product of a fictional mind, which makes the narrative all the more 
remarkable. As an event in history, the mutiny of the Meermin reveals as much, ifnot 
more, than any work of the imagination about the historical reality that gave it birth. 
While a number of themes present themselves for a historically founded exploration, 
it would be wise to begin with an outline of the Madagascan slave trade as it existed 
during the era ofVOC trade hegemony. 
Little historical work has been conducted on the Madagascan slave trade. While many 
adequate primary sources are in existence, few have undertaken to explore this 
significant historical sphere in any great detail. There are a number of exceptions to 
this trend; Robert Shell makes a number of references to the trade in his volume 
Children of Bondage, while James Armstrong and Nigel Worden, in their chapter on 
Cape slavery published in the 2nd edition of The Shaping of South African Society, 
1652-1840 examine the influence ofthe Madagascan trade on slave society in the 
early Cape. Another contribution has been provided by James J. Ravell, a South 
African exile who, while residing in the Netherlands, began to collect historical data 
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on this slave trade with the eventual purpose of submitting a thesis for university 
assessment. Ravell died tragically before he was able to complete his research, and so 
a prime opportunity for uncovering the historical details of this little-known trading 
network was lost. However, he had completed a working paper, entitled "The VOC 
Slave Trade Between Cape Town and Madagascar, 1652-1795", and it is primarily on 
the findings articulated in this document that I am reliant in describing some of the 
features of the trading network in which the Meermin was a participant. 
According to Armstrong and Worden, Madagascar was a primary destination for the 
acquisition of Company slaves131. The close proximity of the island to the Cape was a 
major stimulus to its being targeted by Dutch traders, who were further encouraged by 
the fact that one could navigate within the island's vicinity with relative ease132. 
Endemic warfare on the island provided a steady stream of human cargo for those 
engaged in slaving; thus the Dutch were not the only foreigners purchasing slaves on 
the island, but had been preceded by Islamic and Portuguese slave traders133. As much 
as 65 % of slaves obtained in slaving voyages directly sponsored by the Company at 
the Cape originated from Madagascar134. 
Robert Shell claims that Company slaves, in contrast to the majority of the slaves who 
were owned privately, possessed a degree of commonality in their cultureJ35 • He 
claims that this was because such slaves originated from the same geographical 
region, which naturally entailed that they shared cultural characteristics136. This place 
13l Armstrong and Worden, The Shaping of South African Society, 1652-1840, 2nd• Edition, p. 112. 
132 Ibid. 
133 Ibid, pp. 112-114. 
134 Ibid, p. 112. 












of origin, at least in the 17th and early 18th Centuries, was Madagascar; by 1766 there 
was a significantly broader cultural and geographical range of slaves living in the 
Lodge, but the cultural foundation with which such a Company slave culture 
originated was, in many ways, Madagascan 137 • 
As the title of Ravell's paper suggests, the Dutch-Madagascan slave-trading network 
was facilitated throughout the era ofVOC dominance at the Cape, from van 
Riebeeck's landing in 1652 to the defeat of the VOC by the British invading forces in 
1795. During this period the trade experienced varying levels of activity and 
profitability, and the fortunes of the slave traders fluctuated considerably. What is 
most striking about Ravell' s account is his emphasis on the problematic features of 
the trade; for it would appear that despite the profits that the Company made (the 
extent of which Ravell is uncertain), the trade was beset with difficulties. Such 
difficulties, however, were not necessarily particular to the Madagascan trade, but 
were general features of slave trading networks throughout the world during the 18th 
Century. 
The period 1740-1785 was a period of renewed slaving activity between Madagascar 
and the Cape, following a slump that had characterised the years 1716-1739. By 1766, 
then, the slave trade was a sphere of great activity, with a little more than 100 years 
experience of the VOC in procuring slaves from the island. This trade intensification 
had been stimulated by an acute labour shortage at the Cape that began to be felt from 












expeditions to the island138• Interestingly, a slave mutiny occurred on the VOC vessel 
the Drie Heuvelen in 1753, on the 28th of August; the mutiny was quelled and one of 
the leaders was killed, while the other was broken on the wheel, given the coup de 
grace and then thrown overboardJ39• Ravell refers to the Meermin mutiny as well; 
however, he lacks the details of the wreck, and subsequently confuses the vessel with 
a second Meermin that plied the Madagascan route in the 1780s. The Meermin of 
1766 was thus engaged in a period of great slave traffic, a traffic whose intensity 
would increase during the 1770s and 1780s; and it sailed thirteen years after a 
previous slave uprising had met with an ignominious end140. The significance of 1753 
could not have featured too highly in Muller's list of considerations, as is evidenced 
by the slack measures that he tolerated on his vessel. Thus, two themes are evidently 
at play during the mid-18th Century: firstly, a labour shortage resulting in a marked 
increase in trading expeditions, indicating a decisive intent on the part of the Cape-
based VOC to obtain and maintain as many slaves from Madagascar as possible; and, 
secondly, a recurrent outbreak of violent mutiny, demonstrating a capacity and 
determination on the part of certain Madagascan slaves to give vent to their frustration 
and to attempt to regain their liberty. Both themes are played out in the mutiny of the 
Meermin, in which the factors inherent in each of them motivate and direct the action 
by turns. 
The considerably decent treatment applied to the surviving slaves after their recapture 
is indicative of the significance that the labour shortage in the Cape entailed among 
VOC officials. One could be tempted to think that, given the violent, retributive 
nature of justice that prevailed at the Cape during the 18th Century, the slaves would 













all have been treated in the harshest manner imaginable. As it was, they were 
refreshed and then transported back to the Cape in wagons; Muller and Leij suggest 
that this decision was taken partly for the sake of the women and children, who would 
have found walking back to Cape Town an arduous task. However, an intense labour 
shortage could very well have compelled the Dutch officials to act in a manner 
different to what one might otherwise have expected of them. The slaves were treated 
in such a sensitive fashion, it would thus seem, because they were once more property 
ofthe Company, whose labour usefulness and value would need to be maintained if 
the VOC was to make any future profit out of them. 
Both crew and slaves were afflicted in a large measure by illness, which often resulted 
in death141. Armstrong and Worden claim that illness, as well as slave resistance, 
accounted for a large proportion of the risk that the VOC undertook when engaging in 
slaving expeditions to Madagascar142. There were a number of factors that aggravated 
the spread of disease. For crew members, the tropical climate, which was unfamiliar 
to those recently arrived from Europe, was the main cause of their discomfort. Such a 
climate was responsible for the contraction of fever among many European sailors 
and officers plying the route between Madagascar and the Cape. In the case of Muller, 
one can suppose a high probability that his illness was some kind of tropical fever. He 
does not refer explicitly to any symptoms; thus, once would be let to believe that he 
would have been suffering from a not uncommon ailment, which in this context 
would have been likely to have been a case of tropical fever. The fact that it was not 
fatal would indicate that he was suffering from a mild variant; or perhaps it was the 
adrenaline of three weeks' trauma that kept him alive. 
141 Ibid. 











More importantly, illness affected the slaves as well, causing significant loss of life on 
the voyages from Madagascar to Cape Town143. While the heat of the tropical 
environment no doubt played a large role, the chances of contracting deadly illnesses 
were greatly aggravated by the conditions that the slaves were forced to endure while 
on board ship. The slaves were secured in overcrowded chambers below decks, where 
natural heat was greatly intensified and where sickness could spread extremely 
rapidly144. Such illness often ended in death, as it did with the crew; and Ravell 
provides some detail in his paper about the large numbers of Madagascan slaves that 
were lost during the return of trading expeditions to their port of origin. He calculates 
the average death rate to be 15,67%, a significant statistic145. Couple this with the fact 
that many slaves died of illness within their first few years at the Cape, and one 
begins to gain a picture of a slave route that was prone to significant losses in human 
merchandise, engendering an obvious concern about maintaining its profitability146. It 
is against this background, then, that one must place Muller's decision to free the 
slaves and allow them on deck. Due to the labour shortage, he would have been intent 
on preserving as much of his human cargo as possible; perhaps he wished to impress 
the Company officials with his ability to not only facilitate the purchase of suitable 
slaves but to maintain their numbers over the course of the arduous journey home. 
This could be a reason for the extraordinary conditions that hen allowed to prevail on 
his ship. What is significant is that there are no recorded deaths of slaves by illness on 
the Meermin, and that the total number of slaves purchased was accounted for, either 
through their violent death or through their eventual recapture. Muller's efforts at 














preserving his slaves from succumbing to illness were, to his ultimate detriment, 
successful. 
Ravell also devotes some attention to the ways in which Madagascan slaves would 
resist the imposition of servitude on them. We have two accounts of slave mutinies, 
that of 1753 and that of 1766; and while most slaves did not resist the VOC in so 
dramatic a fashion, they employed other means in attempting to secure their escape l47 • 
There are recorded instances where some went so far as to refuse all food and water, 
to the point of death 148. This is the ultimate form of passive resistance, a means by 
which slaves would sacrifice their own lives so as to escape lifelong servitude and to 
deprive their masters of their recently purchased labour. It thus constituted an 
aggressive act of resistance, albeit one that was passive in its manifestation. Ravell 
also refers to instances where slaves would free themselves of their shackles and leap 
overboard in an attempt to reach shore while the ship was still anchored off the 
Madagascan coastl49 . Slaves would be severely punished for attempting to escape, 
usually through subjection to a cruel beating; such punishments would be inflicted 
after the slaves had appeared before the scheepsraad, a council of ship's officers that 
constituted the second rung of authority under the captain himselfl50 . While some of 
these manifestations are unusual, they serve to reinforce an understanding of the slave 
trade, in Madagascar as anywhere else, as constituting a highly contested space; and, 
given the propensity for slaves to resist in a variety of forms, they highlight the 
ineffectual means adopted by Muller and his officers in stemming what they must 
147 While they don't provide detailed descriptions of slave resistance on Dutch slavers, Armstrong and 
Worden refer both to slave revolts and to escape as two means by which Madagascan slaves resisted 
the Dutch. See Armstrong and Worden, The Shaping of South African Society, 1652-1840, 2nd. Edition, 
E. 119. 













have known to be a very significant danger. Particularly when considering that a slave 
mutiny had occurred on the route less than fifteen years previously, the nonchalance 
of the Meermin officers and sailors is all the more startling. 
It is also of interest to note that the Madagascan trade accounted in large part for the 
significant numbers of female slaves who inhabited the Slave Lodge l5l. Shell 
describes how the Malagasy traders would manipulate negotiations such that the 
Dutch traders would buy a good number of women, despite the fact that their 
preference was for the male genderl52 . Malagasy authorities did this, so Shell claims, 
in order to free themselves of what he describes as 'unneeded or "troublesome" 
women' 153. The large number of female slaves on the Meermin would indicate that 
such practice on the part of Malagasy traders was still in effect in 1766. 
Chapter 5 
The social organisation of sailing vessels during the 18th Century is a theme of 
considerable importance in relation to the Meermin mutiny; for, as has been 
mentioned a number of times, had it not been for a particular atmosphere prevailing 
on the ship the revolt of the slaves, had it occurred at all, would probably have been 
crushed with significantly greater ease. While the available literature on VOC 
maritime authoritative structures is somewhat limited, it is possible to examine the 
particularity of the Meermin's experiences in the light of academic work that has been 
engaging with trading vessels and the merchant marine of European powers during 
the 18th Century, and thus to highlight those aspects and features of the ship's 
communal structure that deviate from the norm and that were culpable in enabling a 













successfully violent uprising against established authority to occur. In a sense, what I 
will be attempting is a historical investigation into the mentalite ofthe Meermin's 
crew. 
By all accounts, discipline and authority aboard VOC merchant vessels was enforced 
by measures that were, for the most part, brutal and violent. C. R. Boxer, in his 
significant work The Dutch Seaborne Empire 1600-1800, claims that "the ships' 
officers usually relied on severe discipline and savage punishments to keep their men 
in order", an attitude adopted by many a skipper towards sailors, who many 
considered to be the lowest form oflife possible154• As sailor crews often consisted in 
a large part of foreigners, harsh discipline was considered appropriate, both to 
consolidate what may otherwise have been a divisive and unruly bunch, and out of a 
certain distrust of those not born in the Netherlands155• The punishments dealt out to 
those considered to have been tardy in fulfilling their duties was particularly severe, 
and by the standards of the 21 st Century brutal and barbaric. Despite nominal 
regulations governing the conduct of conduct of captains and other maritime 
authorities, skippers were prone to exercise their powers with considerable force and 
lack of restraint, and to ignore those restrictions that had been places on their 
authority l56. Shipboard life was certainly harsh, a harshness that was deemed 
necessary to maintain the social structures essential for both safety and success. 
Due to the nature of his work, Boxer provides minimal detail regarding shipboard 
structure and discipline. What he does include, however, coheres to a remarkable 
degree with the findings of historians who have focussed their attentions on the 
154 Boxer, The Dutch Seaborne Empire 1600-1800, p. 70. 
155 Ibid, p. 71. 











Anglo-American maritime world of the 18th Century. When one reads such accounts 
one is struck by the degree of similarity that existed simultaneously in the reality of 
sailor experience and consciousness in both the Atlantic and Indian Ocean trading 
spheres. While any comments that I make in relation to this historical work are thus 
contingent on these generalist similarities, they are useful in constructing a grantedly 
minimalist image of shipboard reality with which can compare and contrast specific 
features and realities that are evidenced in the narrative of the Meermin. 
Two ofthese historians are prominent in the disciplines of both maritime history and 
the history of rebellious and revolutionary activity within the same spatial-temporal 
sphere, and indeed are noted for bringing the two apparently dissimilar fields together 
into a coherent and unified subject of historical analysis. They are Peter Linebaugh 
and Marcus Rediker; they have worked together on a collaborative project entitled 
The Many-Headed Hydra, a work that brings these aforementioned spheres together 
with specific relation to the Atlantic Ocean, while Rediker's previous publication 
Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea is an excellent resource on the same 
geographical and thematic region for the first half of the 18th Century. Both works 
devote the detail to maritime life, authority and discipline that is necessary to fill in 
the gaps in Boxer's account, from where one can investigate the place that the 
Meermin's experience occupies in such a world. 
Perhaps the most obvious, and yet equally the most important, feature of shipboard 
life is the enclosedness of the vessel, the fact that crew, officers and captain were 
compelled to work together in incredibly close proximity in an atmosphere from 
which there existed no means of direct escape. Linebaugh and Rediker describe the 
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This increasingly autocratic and dictatorial frame of authority was certainly not 
uncontested, and Rediker devotes a significant amount of attention to the ways in 
which sailors would resist the violent measures adopted by particularly brutal 
captains. However, this hierarchical structure of authority was to become embedded 
within maritime practice to the point that sailors, no matter how much they resented it, 
were forced to endure the almost unrestricted capacity of their captain to direct and 
discipline according to his own preferences and prejudices. Rediker includes as many 
accounts of sailors who accepted their harsh and brutal punishments as of those who 
attempted to resist, indicating that despite any revolutionary ideals that may have 
come into circulation, many sailors acquiesced to the structure that was imposed upon 
them. While sailors were to construct an oppositional culture that was collectivist and 
anti-authoritarian161 , the hierarchy of authority and discipline was very much a reality 
for them, and was mediated as much by accommodation as by resistance. 
The Meermin, when examined in the light of these details, begins to seem like 
something of an anomaly. In fact, it could be seen to exhibit a counterpoint to many of 
the tendencies that were typical among maritime endeavours of the 18th Century. 
What we see aboard the Meermin is a marked absence of the disciplinary measures 
that had been evolving to govern conduct and productivity, an absence that was itself 
a governing principle of the atmosphere that prevailed on board and that was to 
instigate practices of a decidedly dangerous character. 
Sailors who had become accustomed to the brutal, restricted life on board merchant 
vessels must have found themselves immersed in a radically altered disciplinary 












reality aboard Muller's vessel. To use an over-used phrase, Muller's authority is 
conspicuous by its absence. If one examines the way that he ordered his vessel, that 
he related to both his officers and to his crew and even in the way that he carried 
himself and his position, then one becomes convinced that this man lacked the 
necessary authority that the crew would have expected of a typical captain. What is 
most ironic about his situation is that many of the not infrequent mutinies instigated 
by sailors during the 18th Century were motivated by a dissatisfaction on the part of 
sailors to a particular captain's brutality and excessive manifestations of authority and 
discipline. Muller, as it would appear from the records, was not a captain prone to 
excessive and aggressive acts of punishment, nor did he exert his authority in any 
tangible, not to mention over-exertive, manner. He thus managed to avoid mutiny on 
the part of his crew, but this proved to be of little advantage to him; for, whatever his 
lax authority may have meant to the sailors, it sent a clear message to the slaves. 
Muller's reticence and nonchalance created the conditions whereby the slaves could 
enact their rebellion, a rebellion that, in comparison with most mutinies, was in all 
probability far bloodier and more devastating than any that the crew may have 
enacted had they been so inclined. 
Further illuminations can be gained if one examines Muller's relationship with his 
senior officers, and particularly with Onderstuurman Gulik. When both men appeared 
before the Council of Justice to plead their cases, a mutual tension and animosity 
emerged from their testimony162. Onderstuurman Gulik blamed Muller for not 
supplying him with the necessary instructions to fulfil his tasks; furthermore, he 
claimed that, after the uprising, on every occasion that he inquired of the 











Gesaghebber as to his orders he was told to mind his own business and to remove 
himself from Muller's presence163• Muller's response is equally accusatory, for he 
claimed that he had issued Gulik with the necessary instructions, implying that any 
failure in duty must rest with the Onderstuurman 164• This exchange is no doubt 
coloured by the environment in which it was conducted; both men were being tried 
for negligence, and would have been attempting by any means to shift the blame of 
the accusation so as to minimise their own personal punishment. Nevertheless, a 
distinct tension is very evident, and reflects what appears to be a divergence in 
opinion over the correct roles and conduct invested in the captain and his mate. 
Taking into account what has already been explored about Muller's nonchalant and 
reticent posture (a posture whose reality is reinforced by his testimony, in which he 
claims to have abrogated his authority to Commies Crause due to his incapacitating 
illness165), it is not an unlikely possibility that he had failed to issue Gulik with the 
necessary instructions, or that if he had then that the instructions were insubstantial 
and lacking the necessary weight. Of course, Muller claimed that he had issued the 
instructions; and whether he was lying, or whether Gulik was manipulating, distorting 
or even fabricating evidence in an attempt in an attempt to ameliorate his own 
punishment, is difficult to ascertain from the records. Whatever the truth or falsitude 
of the statements of either men, a mutual distrust, even antagonism, is evident 
between the captain and one of his senior officers; and although such a tension must 
have been exacerbated by the slave mutiny and the brutal realities that they were 
subsequently forced to endure, given Muller's own admissions about his attitude to 
his position and responsibility it is probable that these tensions, which could very well 














Gulik, predated the actual mutiny itself. The fact that Leij rose so readily to the fore is 
evidence of an authority gap, a space in the social organisation and constitution of the 
vessel that had been relinquished by those assigned to it and that needed to be filled. 
Tensions within the officer corps would have exerted a definite influence on the crew 
who served beneath them. To return to Rediker's about the constitution of maritime 
authority, the hierarchical structure that was developed on ships during the first half of 
the 18th Century both reflected and was a direct product of the dissolution of earlier 
forms of paternalist authority and its gradual replacement with structures based on the 
dictates of wage labour166. There was no absolute division between the disappearance 
of the one system and its replacement by the other; rather, the vocabulary of the first 
came to signify the developments of the second, as the reality of social organisation 
and labour authority began to shift and reconstitute according to altered norms167. 
Rediker characterises this shift as one that introduced "the novelty and the uncertainty 
ofthe increasingly stark opposition between boss and wage worker"; it was thus a 
period of significant flux and confusion, particularly for the sailors working on what 
were in effect prototypes for labour organisational structures that were to become 
standard during the 19th Century168. While the Meermin mutiny occurred in the second 
half of the 18th Century, the year 1766 is still close enough to the half-century mark 
that the processes Rediker claims as typical for the years 1700-1750 (his analysis is, 
of course, deliberately bounded by neat temporal dimensions that render his project 
more manageable) would no doubt still have been in evidence in trading vessels such 
as the Meermin. The sailors and officers of such vessels were, in effect, negotiating a 
166 Rediker, Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea, p. 207. 
167 Ibid, pp. 207-208. 











complicated new commercial reality, the processes and specificities of which they 
would only have been partly aware. 
Rediker refers to a "stark opposition between boss and wage worker"; on a ship such 
a relationship would have been personified between the captain and his crew, 
including his senior officers. Thus, class divisions were in emergence on ships, from 
where, it is argued, they were extended to the factories of the industrial era and from 
there entrenched into societal structures throughout Europe. T. H. Wintringham, in a 
historical overview of mutinies he wrote during the 1930s, views the class structures 
and divisions that evolved on ships as a key factor in both the cause and form of the 
mutinies that litter naval history169. While one might consider his comments 
somewhat dated, they certainly shed light on the social realities that governed sailors' 
lives and that moulded their thoughts and actions in particular directions. While the 
Meermin mutiny was not a mutiny of sailors, the class tensions noted by Wintringham 
are evident in other ways. Wintringham quotes Hilaire Beloc as referring to the "close 
quarters" and "small units" in which sailors lived and worked; while such features of 
communal life could instigate mutiny due to the lack of personnel movement and 
turnover, they could also exacerbate internal tensions, particularly between the 
different levels of authoritative hierarchy, that would prove all the more difficult to 
dissolve. What is most striking about the social organisation aboard these ships is the 
constitution of space through which such organisation was mediated. The Meermin 
was a hoeker, a small vessel even by the standards of the time; and while these 
disparities in social rank existed, status and authority, the people who occupied such a 
diversity of positions lived in incredibly close proximity to one another. Wintringham 











describes officers and crew as living "almost on top of each other", and explains that 
such a spatial configuration could bode good or ill for the crew concerned 170. Thus, 
says Wintringham, "the antagonism between sailor and officer should usually be 
sharper than any similar antagonism in the armies"I71. 
Weare thus aware of class constitution and differentiation that was occurring on 
board ships during the 18th Century, as well as the tensions that such processes 
engendered and the ways that the spatial configuration of such vessels could 
exacerbate the antagonisms and difficulties that were both a product of such social 
constitution and, of course, of individual temperaments. On the Meermin, tension 
between the captain and at least one of his senior officers is evidenced by the 
historical record, indicating a fracture in the upper echelons of the hierarchy that 
would have impacted on the social and psychological reality of the crew as a whole. 
Thus, personal aggrandisements were coupled with a social reality that favoured the 
breeding of resentment while reproducing a structure of repression that was itself 
being undermined through the inability, or lack of will, of the captain to play the role 
expected of him, to create an atmosphere that could not have been conducive to the 
running of the vessel according to practices that had come to be accepted as 
normative. Such a reality must have engendered a paradoxical, ironic reaction from 
the crew; the paternalistic, often brutal authority expected of their captain would 
stimulate antagonism and resentment, and yet, in the absence of such an overt and 
over-arching authority, a significant degree of confusion as to role, rank and function 
became manifest. The very lack of that which they no doubt detested was to be the 
means of their undoing. 
170 Ibid, pp. 349-350. 











- - - - ----- ------
Rediker describes how creating a division in the command was a tactic employed by 
sailors as a means of resisting a captain's authority l72. Such tactics sought to divide 
the crew into two groups, one of which would continue to support the captain and the 
other that would support the matel73• Such tactics, when successful, would curtail the 
authority of the captain and loosen discipline aboard the vessel l74• While there was no 
apparently deliberate attempt on the part of any of the Meermin's sailors to employ 
such divisive tactics, it is clear that there did exist a division in the command; and 
thus it is certainly probable that the lax discipline aboard the vessel was as much a 
consequence of this division as it was of Muller's direct ineptitude. The Meermin was 
a vessel whose crew were caught in a space where the expected norms of authority 
and discipline had been suspended, where a division existed between the captain and 
his officers and where regulated conduct and decisive leadership did not occupy the 
positions of importance that the sailors would have ascribed to them. Lack of 
leadership and a divided authority coalesced to create an atmosphere in which 
discipline slackened, guidelines and regulations were forsaken and a laissez-faire 
attitude prevailed over all activities, including the oversight of the slaves. The freeing 
of the slaves and the granting to them of access to the ship and eve, eventually, to 
their own weapons was the ultimate consequence of the conduct of a crew that had 
come to operate according to norms that were foreign to the conditions that such a 
context demanded. Slack discipline and a retiring, bed-ridden captain may have been 
enjoyable for a time; but what the Meermin mutiny truly demonstrates is how 
fractures in a ship's command and an absence of a recognisable and accountable 
authority could create conditions that would lead to a more bloodily humiliating 













experience than the captain, in all of his feverish indolence, would have found 
imaginable. 
While the authority, or the lack thereof, on the Meermin created the conditions that 
enabled a mutiny to be realised, it was of course the slaves who made it happen. 
Without any overt act of defiance and collective resistance on their side, no matter 
how lax discipline was on board the Meermin would have reached the Cape safely, 
and this voyage would have passed into the historical record without signifying 
anything particularly remarkable. 
While slave mutinies occurred during the 18th Century, the available historical 
literature is somewhat restricted. Such rebellions were not, of course, limited to the 
Indian Ocean world of the VOc. Eugene Genovese makes a passing reference to the 
existence of a number of cases where slaves on ships in the slaving network of the 
Americas would mutiny and, when successful, steer the vessel for Haiti or for a 
British territory where they would be assured of protection 175. Slaves who did stage 
mutinies on slaving vessels were thus enacting a particular form of resistance, a 
resistance that was specific to the conditions in which they were located. While the 
circumstances guiding and enabling the Meermin mutiny are particularly unique, the 
motives of the mutineers and the progression of their plans and actions reveals a deep 
affinity with those methods of rebellion by other slaves reacting against similar 
conditions. 
175 Genovese, From Rebellion to Revolution, p. 6. Genovese is obviously referring to the years 
following the abolition ofthe slave trade by the British, when they would have provided protection to 
escaped slaves. Of course, the Meermin's mutiny occurred many decades before such legislation was 
enacted at a time when the British were still very much involved in the slave trade, and so no such 
option would have been available to the mutineers. Nevertheless, the general import is clear; slaves 












The setting of the mutiny is imperative for, as has been emphasised, a ship is an 
enclosed space entailing very conditions that would govern the course of an act of 
resistance. The slaves on the Meermin were not in contact with any larger, broad-
based movement; although they would have originated from a broadly similar region 
and culture, they were cut off from their local communities and from familiar social 
and political structures, on a strange vessel governed by hostile agents who were 
transporting them to a location the nature of which they were wholly unaware. In a 
state of such dislocation and personal trauma, and given the course of the rebellion 
and the verbalised intentions of the mutineers, one can ascertain that the mutiny was 
not motivated ideologically. The key to piecing together the content of this mutiny 
can be found in the slaves' actual demands. They wanted nothing more, it would 
appear, than to be taken home. In this sense of a specifically psychologically induced 
motive, the uprising was impelled by factors that were strictly personal. 
Of course the term "ideology" is itself weighted with contextual interpretation, and 
different levels of significance are applied to it by historians engaged within a variety 
of contexts. What I would maintain is that any comprehensive revolutionary act that 
this mutiny articulates would represent the potential for ideological shifts only in their 
earliest, perhaps one could even say crudest forms. The mutiny on the Meermin does 
not constitute a revolutionary act in the sense of a desired reordering of society 
according to altered norms. Rather, it was an act of resistance that sought to restore a 
previous state of existence, one that had been robbed by these interlopers from across 
the sea. To examine more closely what such an interpretation of this event entails, it is 
necessary to examine the arguments of historians who have considered the sphere of 
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resistance. Their work has not necessarily been conducted on slave mutinies, or even 
on slaves themselves, but their comments illuminate the processes that one observes 
in the slave mutiny of 1766. 
Nigel Penn's analysis of the droster gangs of the Cape interior highlights a feature of 
resistance that is applicable, in a generalised form, to the Meermin mutiny. According 
to Penn, early 18th Century droster gangs, consisting in the main of runaway slaves 
and deserters from VOC service, sought to create a haven for themselves beyond the 
confines of the Cape's urban settlements 176. Some of these slaves even attempted, 
without any measure of success, to reach their native lands, including some who 
attempted to journey back to Madagascar177. The action that dominated this resistance 
was flight; and while these bands would prey on European settlers and Khoi, causing 
significant problems for the VOC authorities, they did not seek to directly attack 
political and cultural institutions or introduce radical social structures. Penn's 
comments echo those of Genovese, albeit to a limited degree. Genovese describes the 
creation of what he calls "maroon societies", communities of runaway slaves who had 
fled to a hinterland beyond the reach of colonial surveillance from where they 
organised their own societies and waged guerrilla warfare l78 . In terms of specific 
content, the affinities between Penn's droster gangs and Genovese's maroon societies 
are minimal; the latter were self-propagating units who often formed functional, albeit 
fragile, polities, while the former usually consisted of no more than a dozen members 
and were curtailed by geographical circumstances from forming structured communal 
networks. However, a similar impulse can be located as the foundation for these 
divergent manifestations of early slave resistance. They both reflect a compulsion to 
176 Penn, Rogues, Rebels and Runaways, pp. 73 and 86. 
177 Ibid, p. 74. ' 











flee beyond the confines of structured and coercive labour control and to re-create the 
sense of freedom and personal autonomy that they considered their legitimate right. 
As such, they predated the social revolutionary activities that would come into play 
particularly in the 19th Century, such as the Galant revolt in the Cape hinterland. 
One might ask what rebellious activity on land has to do with a slave mutiny that 
occurred at sea. While the material conditions that invest acts of resistance with their 
particularity are undoubtedly different, a decidedly familiar impetus is in play at the 
level of the collective motivation of the mutineers. One could view the mutiny on the 
Meermin as a manifestation of resistance as flight, albeit one that is transposed to a 
small vessel with no immediate access to a place of refuge. The desire to return home 
that is evident in some of the droster gangs is articulated by Massavana and his 
mutineers; however, their freedom of movement and means of resistance was severely 
curtailed by the enc10sedness of the vessel, an enc10sedness that restricted their 
options to virtually one course of action. The slaves could not flee of their own 
volition and attempt to make their own way back home, while they were 
simultaneously bound together as a single unit by their circumstances and were unable 
to fragment into different gangs and communities. All this, surely, goes without 
saying; and yet it is imperative to emphasise the way that geography, physical 
position and material circumstance both determined and mediated this act of rebellion. 
The only way that these slaves could flee their impending servitude and return to their 
homes was by employing the services, and indeed the very mechanical apparatus, of 
those who had enforced such a state upon them in the first place; material 
circumstances did not allow any other course open to them. Of course a violent 














nostalgic longing for a familiar geography and community, and such a reality is best 
comprehended as a product both of historical circumstance and context and of 
personal agency. It will serve to note that the mutiny reflected an intent on the part of 
the slaves to return to liberty in their own land, and not to press for any movement 
larger or more over-arching than this. As such, while the mutiny certainly constituted 
a contribution to the later organisation of resistance and, eventually, revolution geared 
towards political change of the sort that is explored by Linebaugh and Rediker in their 
work, it was not in itself an act of revolution, but rather an act of restorative rebellion. 
It is important to clarify the category of resistance if one is to best comprehend the 
processes at work. 
In order to illuminate what such an act entails within its historical context, it is useful 
to examine the work of an eminent historian whose work yet focuses neither on slaves 
nor on mutinies. I am referring to Eric Hobsbawm, the economic historian whose 
various works have reshaped the academy's perceptions towards the great processes 
that had shaped the last few centuries of world history. He has also written a 
fascinating text the content of which impinges on certain features that have been 
discussed in these pages. The work I am referring to is Bandits; while one might be 
inclined to consider a work with such a title inappropriate for this subject, and while 
the mutineers of the Meermin were not bandits in any conventional or, indeed, 
Hobsbawmian sense, their actions and, particularly, their motivations reflect an 
undercurrent that Hobsbawm's work will assist in clarifying. The so-called 
"restorationist" project that marked the mutiny on the Meermin, and that has been 
demonstrated to characterise the resistance efforts of slaves more generally, was not 















Rather, it is within the sphere of a larger social mobilisation that Hobsbawm 
historically locates a resistance that he labels "social banditry". 
Crucial to Hobsbawm's thesis is his assertion that bandits are not "ideologists" or 
"prophets", and are thus not concerned with devising and enacting revolutionary 
social or political visions179. Such rebels "have no ideas other than those of the 
peasantry ... of which they form a part"; thus, they do not seek to alter the society of 
which they are a part, but rather to protect it from forces of disruption 180. In this sense, 
there are affinities between Hobsbawm's social bandits, Penn's droster gangs, 
Genovese's maroon societies and, although in highly altered geographical and social 
circumstances, the slaves of the Meermin. 
Where Hobsbawm's analysis is most relevant is in his succinct summation of the 
social bandit's proj ect. Its affinity with slave resistances of the 18th Century resides in 
its lack of an ideological foundation; in Hobsbawm's words, it is the "defence or 
restoration of the traditional order of things 'as it should be"', and thus does not 
consist of revolutionary content181 . This is perhaps the broadest, and yet at the same 
time the most exact, description that one could apply to the Meermin mutiny in terms 
of its general features and affinities with other social movements. In the Meermin's 
context, the "traditional order of things" was, of course, the life of liberty on the 
island that the mutineers had enjoined prior to their enslavement; and their violent act 
of rebellion was in fact a form of defence, a defence of a state of existence that had 
been threatened and, indeed, usurped by exterior forces. The demand for a safe return 
to Madagascar was itself a restorative act, a bid for a return to the accepted and the 
179 Hobsbawm, Bandits, p. 24. 
180 Ibid. 











familiar; there are no articulated motives to revolutionise either local society on the 
island or indeed the one that the slaves had constructed for themselves to facilitate the 
mutiny. Bearing in mind, of course, that slavery was still an accepted practice on 
Madagascar, and would remain so for a good time to come, these slaves were 
rebelling not so much against the institution of slavery as they were against their own 
personal enslavement, an enslavement that had removed them from the traditional 
sphere of community and society and had placed them in an alien and brutalising 
environment. At the risk of becoming redundant, let me conclude with one comment; 
that, while this mutiny and others like it may have constituted, in part, the seeds of 
what was to become popular revolutionary activity with a mass appeal, it was not 
conceived nor enacted with such motivations in evidence. The mutineers of the 
Meermin sought to restore what had been taken from them, to defend a conception of 
justice rooted not in revolution but in preservation; whatever revolutionary or 
ideological undercurrents one may be tempted to glean from the narrative, such 
undercurrents were not enjoined by the active participants at the level of self-
awareness. 
To complete the analysis of the mutiny, it is necessary to examine how the slaves 
enacted their rebellion and the means by which they organised and constituted their 
collective action. In the narrative, I placed great emphasis on the apparently 
spontaneous nature of the mutiny. This is not to claim that prior to gaining access to 
weapons the slaves had no active intent or desire to return home; Sleigh's account 
notes that Massavana was very much intent on obtaining some means of freeing 
himself and of returning to the island, and it would certainly not be unreasonable to 
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suggest that the majority of his contemporaries shared his aspirations182. Whatever 
inner compulsion there may have been to fulfil these ambitions, however, the 
evidence would suggest that the mutiny, when it occurred, manifested more in the 
way of anger and rage than it did of a predetermined plan to obtain a means of 
returning home. Circumstances were ripe, and were seized at an opportune moment; 
the ensuing massacre reveals much about the impulses that governed the slaves' 
actions during the mutiny itself. 
Some of the features that I noted in the narrative require further exploration. Firstly, 
the slaves who had gained access to the weapons attacked the sailors immediately 
and, it would appear, indiscriminately. They even went so far as to wound Muller 
severely, a man who, had they been considering the possibility of enjoining the crew 
to return them home, would have been the most useful man to spare from injury. One 
could go so far to say that the slaves acted wholly out of malicious intent, although it 
was not a malice that had not been founded on good reason. Such aggression must 
have been the natural response of the slaves when provided with a means to retaliate 
against those who had inflicted such cruelty upon them. Revenge, it would appear, 
was the dominant expression of the collective will; as has been described; the sailors 
who could not obtain refuge in the Constapelskamer were killed mercilessly, while 
the act of casting lots as to the fate of the five survivors is an indication of the 
apparent gratification that the mutineers took in exerting absolute authority, to the 
point of the granting of life or death, over the sailors. What one is witness to here is a 
kind of euphoria stemming from this sudden reversal of fortune and position; and the 











casting of lots demonstrates the deadly playfulness with which the mutineers 
celebrated their incredibly sudden occupation ofthe position of supreme authority. 
Secondly, the temporal moulding of events would itself have shaped the form that 
this, mutiny assumed. The slaves were no doubt becoming accustomed to the 
conditions that Muller authorised on his ship, whereby they had been allowed on deck 
and indeed been assigned tasks at various locations on the vesseL The lax discipline 
must have impressed itself upon them; perhaps even the friction between Muller and 
Gulik, as well as any that may have existed between the captain and other members of 
his officers and crew, may have been noticeable among the more sensitive slaves. 
Thus, they would have accustomed to the evident lack in vigilance and overt 
authority, and this may well have stimulated Massavana and others, those who were 
to form the leadership of the mutineers, to more definitive speculations about the 
possibility of overthrowing Muller and his compatriots and thus regaining their 
freedom. Whatever the truth may be, the actual ac of mutiny was defined by a 
particular opportune moment, when Commies Crause assigned the slaves the task of 
cleaning their weapons and then left them without adequate supervision. It is almost 
as if time compresses around this point; the frustrations, anger and possible schemes 
that were slowly coalescing among the slaves fused at this particular moment, and an 
action was undertaken according to the dictates of opportunity, and not by a 
considered enactment of a pre-determined course of action. Such an opportunity was 
something that the slaves no doubt had not been backing on occurring; the mutiny of 
the Meermin is thus centred around this moment, a seizure of opportunity and a 
resultant violence that is its own expression of the fraught reality of which the space 











It was only after the bloodletting that the slaves articulated their demands; and it is in 
the process of negotiation and the events that followed it that one can analyse the 
ways that the slaves organised themselves so as to most ably realise their intentions. 
In a narrative that is replete with paradox, we are confronted with yet another irony 
that startles as much as it reveals; that is, the fact that it was the ascension of the 
slaves to command that saw the return of discipline and overt authority to shipboard 
life that had been degraded under Muller's command. This followed a period 
culminating in the negotiations between the crew and the mutineers, during which the 
slaves consolidated themselves into an organised and hierarchical unit that would 
form a formidable force, one that could only be defeated by guile and deceit. 
In the organisational structure that the mutineers adopted there are certain affinities 
with features of sailors' mutinies that are explored by Rediker. Successful mutinies 
are not ad hoc affairs with no direction or supervision from above; on the contrary, the 
authority of the captain is challenged by another authority figure, one who has gained 
the assent and support of the crew and is viewed as a more capable leader than the 
incumbent. As Rediker describes it, in the mutinies he examines "self-consciously 
organised centres of authority and control emerged from below to challenge for 
power"; without a challenge from such a "centre of authority", the mutineers would 
have lacked the collective will and communal discipline to maintain their control over 
the vessel183 . Of course, the mutineers did outnumber the sailors significantly, which 
is why, once they were armed, they were able to defeat the sailors so convincingly; 
but their numerical superiority was organised in such a manner that the sailors, even 












when allowed to return above decks, found no opportunity to confront the mutineers 
in any convincing way. It was referred in the narrative how, when Leij was directing 
the sailors and the slaves in the pretence of returning to Madagascar, the move of 
every European was under constant surveillance from the mutineers' authority. The 
crew were never in the position whereby they could have led a concerted offensive on 
the slaves to regain control of the Meermin, and this was largely due to the 
authoritative presence of the mutineers, a presence that is markedly different from that 
of Muller. 
From what is possible to gather, three leaders of the mutineers stand out. The first, the 
man identified as the leader at his death on the beach of the Soetendaal's Valleij, 
remains nameless; about him very little is revealed. What one can deduce from his 
existence, however, is that he personified a very definite centre of authority aboard 
the vessel, to the extent that a sailor would label him very specifically as the leader of 
the mutineers. The fact that he was recognised as such indicates that authority was 
centralised, and not dispersed throughout the slave body. 
The two names that are recorded are, as has been mentioned, Massavana and 
Koesaaij. These two men were banished to Robben Island after their return to Cape 
Town, not under a direct criminal sentence but so as to be monitored for an indefinite 
period oftime184. The reason for this rather unusual measure is the uncertainty that 
persisted in comprehending the role that these two played in the mutiny. In the 
minutes in the Rolls for 1766, it is recorded that they are "believed" to have been 
highly involved in the uprising, in the seizing of the vessel and the massacre of the 











crew; however, due to a degree of uncertainty and insufficient evidence to actually 
impose a sentence, the authorities remained unsure to what extent they were involved, 
and of the specificities of the authoritative relationship that they had engaged with the 
other slaves185 • While it is clear, then, that an authority did exist, the actual positions 
occupied by Massavana and Koesaaij within this authority structure remains 
something of a mystery. It was decided that they would be closely examined on 
Robben Island, in the hope of shedding further light on the matter I 86. While one is 
thus limited by the apparent incomprehension of the record keepers in constructing an 
exact analysis of the mutineers' authority, there is enough evidence to indicate that 
such a structure did exist, that it was recognised as such, although to varying levels of 
detail and degree, by the crew and officers who provided the court with testimonies, 
and that it constituted enough presence to articulate a desired goal and then to ensure 
that the means to realising such a goal were followed by all concerned. It was the 
mutineers' lack of navigational skills juxtaposed with the sailors' possession of them 
that was their undoing; this was the extent and the success of the crews' guile, and it 
was this, rather than any obvious weakness or deficiency on the part of the mutineers, 
which enabled their recapture. Whether the consolidation of such a central authority 
reflected a hierarchy already present in the slaves' ranks, or whether it developed 
during the course of the voyage or in the interim period between the massacre and the 
negotiations, is difficult to uncover to any definite degree. Bearing in mind that the 
slaves would have hailed from a variety of different communities and regions, it 
seems likely that the authority became centred around a number of capable and 
decisive leaders whose talents would have emerged at varying degrees after the 













moment of crisis, after the massacre when the slaves would have been forced to figure 
out a coherent plan of action. Such an authority could very well have reflected social 
and cultural norms in Malagasy society; it was, of course, male dominated, which is 
probably to be expected. What is perhaps most significant is the extent to which this 
mutiny, as bizarre as its particular unfolding may have been, reflects tendencies and 
principles that are common to other acts of resistance that occurred at a similar period 
in history; and that such resistance was not configured according to an anarchic 
principle of diffused authority throughout the mass base of the resistors, but rather 
according to a centralised authority that reacted against, and succeeded in 
overthrowing and replacing, the one that had been established. The short tenure of the 
mutiny does nothing to moderate the existence of such affinities, not does it diminish 
the rebellion's achievement. 
The uprising of the Meermin provides what must be one of the most exciting 
historical events of the 18th Century in what is now the Western Cape. Not only is it a 
stirring narrative, however; it also reveals a significant amount about the maritime 
world of the VOC during the 18th Century and the commonalities it shares with that of 
the Atlantic, as well as about slave consciousness and the dynamics that drive certain 
forms of slave resistance. The uprising proves the extent to which violent and 
dramatic events illuminate the processes and social movements that remain hidden in 
much of history. As such, it is far more than a gripping yarn; it is a vitally important 
contribution to this nation's history and heritage. It is the hope of the author that this 
narrative, and its accompanying analysis, does something to shed light on a history 
that has not been completely written. Furthermore, it is hoped that it contributes to the 
existing historical work that has been conducted on slavery and on the social world of 
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the VOC, a world that, as has here been so clearly demonstrated, was marked by 
tensions that could very easily erupt into violence and bloodshed. 
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